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A RACE OR A NATION? CHEROKEE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND
THE STATUS OF FREEDMEN’S DESCENDENTS
S. Alan Ray

*

Abstract
Critics of tribal sovereignty increasingly point to perceived contradictions between
the egalitarian ideals of modern democracies and the citizenship criteria of Indian nations
to argue for diminished tribal sovereign immunity and increased federal intervention in
Indian affairs. When tribes employ citizenship criteria based on Indian ancestry, they may
be asked to explain why they are not engaging in immoral, if not unlawful, race-based
discrimination. Strenuous assertions of tribal sovereignty may (or may not) convince critics
of the right of federally-recognized tribes to engage in such conduct, but they do not go to
the deeper question of how tribes ought to determine citizenship criteria from within their
own norms and values.
The Cherokee Nation faces the challenge of determining its citizenship criteria as it
pertains to the descendents of the Cherokee Freedmen. As former slaves of Cherokee
citizens, the Freedmen were adopted after the Civil War and given full rights of Cherokee
citizenship under a treaty with the United States. The incorporation of the Freedmen into
the tribe was resisted from the start, and now, faced with a decision of the Cherokee
Nation’s highest court affirming the descendants’ citizenship rights, the Nation prepares to
vote on a constitutional amendment which would impose an Indian “blood quantum”
requirement for citizenship based on the federal Dawes Rolls of the allotment era. If
approved, potentially thousands of African-descended citizens would be eliminated from
the tribal registry. These citizens ask, is the Cherokee Nation a race or a nation? Other
Cherokees rejoin that citizenship in an Indian tribe should be restricted to persons of Indian
ancestry. In this Article, Professor Ray examines the legal and social history of the
Cherokee Freedmen to criticize definitions of Cherokee political identity based on either
the Dawes Rolls or notions of “Indian blood.” Both, he argues, are heteronymous
authorities for determining tribal citizenship criteria and should be replaced by the critical
hermeneutic of indigenous cultural resources. Professor Ray offers a model for
constructing tribal citizenship criteria that attempts to deliver ancestry from biology, and
law from legal fetishism of the Dawes Rolls. The wise use of sovereignty, he suggests,
requires sustained dialogue between Freedmen’s descendents and Cherokees by ancestry,
not the “quick fix” of the political process.

INTRODUCTION
The Cherokee Nation1 stands at a crossroads. On March 7, 2006, the
Nation’s highest court in Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation reversed itself
and ruled that the descendents of former slaves owned by Cherokee
citizens—the Cherokee Freedmen—were citizens of the Nation under its
Constitution of 1975.2 The Court’s decision provoked immediate and
*

Senior Vice Provost and Affiliate Associate Professor of Political Science,
Philosophy, and Justice Studies, University of New Hampshire. J.D., University of
California, Hastings College of the Law; Ph.D., Harvard University Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences (The Study of Religion).
1
Hereinafter “the Cherokee Nation” or “the Nation.” The entity is also known
popularly as “the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.”
2
Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, Lela Ummerteske, Registrar, and
Registration Committee (JAT-04-09), March 7, 2006 (hereinafter “Lucy Allen”),
http://www.cherokee.org/docs/news/Freedman-Decision.pdf (last visited August 16, 2006),
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strong reaction from tribal leadership, Freedmen’s descendents, and many
of the Nation’s citizens. On June 12, 2006, the Tribal Council passed a
resolution to amend the Constitution to grant citizenship only to
Cherokees listed on the Dawes Rolls or their descendants with a degree of
Cherokee “blood” or adopted Delaware or Shawnees.3 African Americans
who trace their ancestry to the Cherokee Freedmen felt keenly the
exclusionary effects of the Council’s action and anticipated their potential
expulsion from the tribe’s political life should the vote on the amendment
in June 2007 go against them. The Nation prepares to perform its
sovereign right to establish its citizenship criteria, therefore, in a social
context marked by racial division. At issue is whether the Cherokee
Nation should legally exclude members, present and future, who have no
demonstrable “Indian blood,” and more fundamentally, whether the
political identity of the Cherokee Nation centers on biology or law.
This Article examines the Cherokee Freedmen controversy to assess
whether law and biology can function as sufficient models for crafting
Cherokee identity at this crucial moment in the tribe’s history. I will argue
that while law and biology are historically powerful frames for establishing
tribal self-identity, they are inadequate to the task of determining who
should enjoy national citizenship. The wise use of sovereignty, I will
suggest, lies in creating a process of sustained dialogical engagement
among all citizens of the Cherokee Nation on the question of Cherokee
identity. This dialogue should ideally be undertaken before the Nation
moves to the political solution of a vote on tribal citizenship criteria. The
reversing Riggs v.
Ummerteskee (JAT-97-03-K), August 15, 2001,
(last
http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/pdf/Riggs_Vs_Ummerteskee_JAT97_03_K.pdf
visited August 16, 2006). “Constitution” when capitalized refers to the Constitution of the
Cherokee Nation. “Court” when capitalized refers to the Judicial Appeals Tribunal (JAT),
the supreme court of the Nation. The Lucy Allen Court addressed itself to the document
variously referred to as the “the 1975 Constitution” or “the 1976 Constitution.” The same
document was approved by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on September 5, 1975, and
was ratified by the Cherokee people on June 26, 1976. Cherokee Nation Tribal
Government, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=government (last visited
August 16, 2006). This Article will refer to “the 1975 Constitution” in deference to the
Court’s preferred term. At the time the Court decided Lucy Allen, the Cherokee Nation had
popularly approved a new organic document, drafted after constitutional convention in
1999 (hence “the 1999 Constitution”) and approved by referendum in 2003. However,
because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had not approved the 1999 Constitution, the
Lucy Allen Court was operating under the 1975 Constitution. The 1999 Constitution does
not address itself to the status of the Freedmen’s descendents and makes no substantive
change to the 1975 Constitution regarding criteria for citizenship. See Comparison of the
1976
and
1999
Constitutions,
(last
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc1999Changes.pdf
visited August 16, 2006).
3
A Resolution Proposing an Amendment to Article III, Section I of the Cherokee
Nation Constitution and Pursuant to Article XV, Section 2, Imposing a Degree of Indian
Blood
Requirement
for
Citizenship
into
the
Cherokee
Nation,
http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=tcmagenda&agenda=tcm061206 (last visited
August 16, 2006). On the adoption of the Shawnee and Delaware, see infra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text.
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exclusion of the Freedmen’s descendents without such a dialogue could
have high political and social costs to the Nation, its members, and its
potential former members. The dialogue I propose could be constructed
along the lines suggested by sociologist Eva Garroutte, whose model of
Radical Indigeneity offers one means of considering these complex issues
from within the Cherokee community itself.
I will begin by providing an overview of the Court’s decision in Lucy
Allen and the response of the Tribal Council in seeking to amend the
Constitution. I will then examine the adequacy of legal and biological
definitions to establish Cherokee identity in the context of the Freedmen
controversy. Finding both inadequate to this larger task, I will present the
alternative of Radical Indigeneity and explore how it could be a resource for
the tribe in resolving the current crisis of Cherokee identity.
I.

LUCY ALLEN AND THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY

On March 7, 2006, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the Cherokee
Nation issued its long-awaited opinion in the case of Lucy Allen. In a 2-1
decision,4 the supreme court of the second-largest Indian nation in the
country ruled that descendants of freed slaves of the Cherokee
(“Freedmen”)5 were entitled to citizenship. Cherokee Freedmen were
African-descended people who had been owned by Cherokees until their
emancipation by the Nation in 1863.6 Under the terms of the Treaty of 1866
reconciling the Cherokees with the United States, the tribe agreed to adopt
the Freedmen as citizens and amended its Constitution accordingly.7 Many
Freedmen and their descendants, though not all, were listed on the Final
Rolls of the Dawes Commission which were, and are, the exclusive means
by which to establish Cherokee Nation citizenship.8
Petitioner Lucy Allen “is a descendent of individuals listed on the
Dawes Commission Rolls as ‘Cherokee Freedmen.’”9 Allen sought a
declaration that language in the Cherokee statutes requiring that citizenship
be “derived only through proof of Cherokee blood”10 was unconstitutional
4

Stacy L. Leeds, J., Darrell Dowty, J. (concurring), Darrell R. Matlock, Jr.
(dissenting).
5
In this Article “Freedmen” refers to the freed slaves themselves. I indicate their
descendents separately (“Freedmen and their descendents”). Conventional denotation often
uses “the Freedmen” to refer alternately to the historically emancipated class of persons
and to their descendents, allowing context to make clear which group is meant.
6
The Cherokee National Council had emancipated all slaves “within the limits of the
Cherokee Nation” in 1863. DANIEL F. LITTLEFIELD, JR., THE CHEROKEE FREEDMEN: FROM
EMANCIPATION TO AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 16 (1978).
7
See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
8
See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
9
Lucy Allen, at 1.
10
11 C.N.C.A. § 12 (A). The Court also struck down on the same grounds 11
C.N.C.A. § 12 (B), which states, “The Registrar will issue tribal membership to a person
who can prove that he or she is an original enrollee listed on the Final Rolls [Dawes Rolls]
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“because it is more restrictive than the membership criteria set forth in
Article III of the 1975 Constitution.”11 Article III, Section 1 of the 1975
Constitution provides:
All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven
by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls, including the
Delaware Cherokees of Article II of the Delaware Agreement
dated the 8th day of May 1867, and the Shawnee Cherokees as of
Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated the 9th day of June,
1969, and/or their descendents.12
All parties agreed that the Freedmen and their descendents, if they
appeared on the Dawes Rolls, were “citizens” prior to the enactment of the
1975 Constitution. The Dawes Rolls consist of multiple rolls whose pages
(apropos the Nation) are captioned, “Cherokee by Blood,” “Minor
Cherokees by Blood,” “Cherokee Freedmen,” “Minor Cherokee Freedmen,”
“Delaware Cherokee,” and “Intermarried Whites.”13 The Nation argued that
the voters intended to exclude the Freedmen and therefore no mention of
them was made in Article III. The Court rebuffed that argument, noting that
Article III was also silent on the inclusion of Cherokees by “blood,” yet no
one would argue that they were excluded from citizenship. In fact, the 1975
Constitution makes no legal distinction among the different Dawes Rolls
and therefore does not single out for tribal citizenship only those who
appear or whose descendents appear on a roll of Indians by “blood.”
Consequently, the Lucy Allen Court held that the Freedmen and their
descendents did not lose their citizenship as a result of the adoption of the
1975 Constitution and subsequent legislation imposing a “blood”
requirement for tribal citizenship was unconstitutionally restrictive.14 The
Court made clear that the Dawes Rolls are the touchstone for all Cherokee
political rights: “[T]he 1975 Constitution affirms these rights by linking
citizenship to one single document: the Dawes Rolls.”15

by blood or who can prove to at least one direct ancestor listed by blood on the Final
Rolls.”
11
Lucy Allen, at 1.
12
CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, §1 (1975).
13
Because the Cherokee Nation had agreed to the federal government’s request after
the Civil War to adopt as citizens Shawnee and Delaware tribal members, there are also
separate pages captioned “Delaware Cherokee,” while Shawnee are included on the
Cherokee by Blood roll and indicated accordingly. Thus it is possible from the Dawes
Rolls to determine to a legal if not moral certainty, who is a person with “Indian blood” and
by the principle of exclusion, who is not. Under the taxonomy of tribal citizenship
established by the Dawes Rolls it is not necessary to have “Cherokee blood”—the cases of
the Shawnee and Delaware, intermarried whites, and Freedmen demonstrate that legal
relationships of adoption or marriage are sufficient to qualify one (and one’s descendents)
for citizenship.
14
Lucy Allen, at 22 (“11 C.N.C.A. § 12 adds a ‘by blood’ requirement [for citizenship]
that simply does not exist in Article III.”).
15
Id. at 4.
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As a result of the Lucy Allen decision, as many as 45,000 people of
African descent may choose to be added to a citizenship base of
approximately 240,000.16 The decision provoked strong reaction from the
Cherokee leadership. Concered that “three people” could “change[] the last
30 years of Cherokee governance,” Principal Chief Chad Smith called for a
popular vote, where the issue of whether to amend the Constitution could be
decided “at the polls . . . once and for all.”17 Marilyn Vann, President of the
Descendants of Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes, denounced such a
move as a transparent effort to deny black Cherokees their rightful place in
the Cherokee polity. She asked, “Is the Cherokee Nation a ‘race’ or a
‘nation’?”18
Chief Smith, in a lengthy statement, rejoined that the delegates voting to
approve the 1975 Constitution intended to exclude the Freedmen’s
descendants, and those delegates believed “that an Indian nation should be
composed of Indians.”19 The Tribal Council agreed with Chief Smith that
the question was ripe for political decision by the voters, and on June 12,
2006, in a 13-2 vote, approved an amendment “which will exclude
Freedmen from the tribe's rolls.”20 In the same meeting, so eager for
political action were some proponents of the amendment that the Council
16

Between March 7, 2006 (the day Lucy Allen was decided) and May 1, 2006,
approximately 800 Freedmen’s descendents became citizens of the Nation. About 800
Cherokee
Freedmen
Enrolled
Since
Decision,
May
1,
2006,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/013718.asp (last visited August 16, 2006).
17
“By a 2 to 1 vote, three people essentially changed the last 30 years of Cherokee
Nation governance. . . . I believe the Cherokee people should answer the question once and
for all of who should be entitled to Cherokee citizenship as well as the status of the
Freedmen.” Citizen Views Fall on Both Sides of Freedmen Issue, March 27, 2006,
www.cherokee.org (follow “Government” hyperlink; then follow “Executive” hyperlink;
then follow “Chief’s Corner” hyperlink) (last visited August 16, 2006) (hereinafter
“Freedmen Statement”). Chief Smith is officially neutral on the merits: "I want to make
sure that my position on this is that I'm not advocating for or against the Freedmen. My
position on this is that it's such a monumental issue, the people should decide, and that's the
whole purpose.” Freedmen Debate Spreads to Communities, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian
Advocate, August 2006, www.cherokee.org (follow “Phoenix” hyperlink; then follow
“Archives” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 2006). However, he is widely perceived in
the press as supporting the amendment. See, e.g., Cherokee Chief Wants Freedmen Out of
Tribe, March 15, 2006, http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/012980.asp) (last visited
August 16, 2006); Cherokee Chief Criticized for Stance on Freedmen, March 17, 2006,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2006/013017.asp) (last visited August 16, 2006); Cherokee
Leader
Wants
to
Overturn
Freedmen
Decision,
2006,
http://www.kten.com/Global/story.asp?S=4633347 (last visited August 16, 2006).
18
Cherokee Chief Calls for an “Indian” Nation by Blood, March 20, 2006,
http://indianz.com/News/2006/013060.asp (last visited August 16, 2006).
19
Freedmen Statement, supra note 17.
20
Council Amends Constitution to Exclude Freedmen, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian
Advocate, July 2006, www.cherokee.org (follow “Phoenix” hyperlink; then follow
“Archives” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 2006). The Phoenix reported that
“Councilors Bill Baker, Audra Conner, Jackie Bob Martin, David Thornton, Don Garvin,
Linda O'Leary, Melvina Shotpouch, Johnny Keener, Meredith Frailey, Cara Cowan-Watts,
Bill Johnson, Buel Anglen and Chuck Hoskin voted to amend the constitution. Councilors
Joe Crittenden and Phyllis Yargee voted against the measure.” Id.
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narrowly turned back a motion that would have required a special election
by November 4, 2006, to settle the question; undeterred, supporters of the
special election began a petition drive to achieve their objective.21 The
Council’s action placed the proposed amendment on the ballot of the June,
2007, general election. Because Lucy Allen affirmed Freedmen’s
descendents’ citizenship, these African-descended Cherokees will have the
opportunity to vote on the amendment; already many who are eligible but
not yet members are registering for tribal citizenship.22 Whether or not they
are successful at the polls, the history of the Freedmen’s relationship with
the Cherokee Nation does not suggest that the question of Cherokee
political and social identity will be answered by a single election.
II. THE FREEDMEN CONTROVERSY AS A CRISIS OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL IDENTITY
A. A Race or a Nation? Identity by Blood or Base Roll
Freedmen descendent Marilyn Vann’s succinct statement of the
problem, “Is the Cherokee Nation a ‘race’ or a ‘nation’?,”23 offers a choice
between a conception of the tribe as a genealogical club whose members
share a common lineage, and a notion of the tribe as a political sovereign
whose citizenship criteria do not discriminate on the basis of race. In
support of the latter alternative, Vann observes that “[t]he federal
government does not have government to government relationships with
‘races’ but with nations.”24
Vann’s otherwise valid point obscures the fact that such governmentto-government relationships are, as to tribal governments, with Indian
nations, thus begging the question, when, if ever, Cherokee Nation
citizenship can be divorced from the Native American genealogy of
Cherokee Nation members. As Chief Smith observed, some Cherokees
believe “an Indian nation should be composed of Indians.”25 Put in such
stark terms, the choice for Cherokee Nation voters in 2007 comes down to
selecting a political identity based on biology or law—opting for tribal

21

Id. (“The vote on the resolution calling for a special election was 8-7. At least 10
votes or two-thirds of the council was needed to call for a special election.”). Freedmen’s
descendents were relieved that a special election would not be held: “Leslie Ross of Suisun
City, Calif., a Cherokee citizen by blood and a Freedmen, attended the council meeting to
support other Freedmen and thought it was "good we won't have a special election." He
said the councilors who want ‘to kick us out’ should read the tribe's history. Part of that
history, he said, includes his great-grandfather Stick Ross who served on the Tribal
Council.” Id. On Freedmen’s participation in Cherokee governance during the late
nineteenth century, see infra, note 100.
22
See supra note 16.
23
Cherokee Chief Calls for an “Indian” Nation by Blood, supra note 18.
24
Id.
25
Freedmen Statement, supra note 17.

8

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

[20-Aug-06

citizenship by a show of “Indian blood” or by the appearance of an ancestor
of any race simply because they appear on one of the Dawes Rolls.
The latter point deserves elaboration. As employed in the rhetoric of
citizenship, “Indian blood” is a larger racial category than “Cherokee
blood” and includes Dawes-enrolled Shawnees and Delawares and their
descendents, who became Cherokee citizens as a result of treaties between
the Nation and the United States after the Civil War.26 Significantly, the
listings of Shawnees and Delawares on the Dawes Rolls indicate only
degrees of Shawnee or Delaware “blood,” not degrees of “Cherokee blood,”
if any, so Shawnees and Delawares remain Cherokee citizens by adoption,
like the Freedmen and intermarried whites, not citizens “by blood.” Yet, as
Shawnees and Delawares, they are indigenous people and therefore
potentially members by “Indian blood.” “Cherokees by blood” are
denominated as such on the “Cherokee by blood” and “Minor Cherokees by
blood” rolls. Further, although many of the Freedmen or their descendents
at the time of enrollment may in fact have had Native American ancestry,
such lineage was not recognized by the agents of the Dawes Commission,
who consistently enrolled these “black Indians” under the Freedmen Roll.27
Thus, amending the Constitution to impose a “Cherokee by blood”
requirement, or status as a descendent of an adopted Shawnee or Delaware,
according to the Dawes Rolls, would effectively eliminate only descendents
of the Freedmen and intermarried whites, while de facto constructing a
citizenship composed exclusively of “Indians by blood.” While “Indian
blood” as established by the Dawes Rolls would be sufficient for tribal
citizenship, “Cherokee blood” is now, and would continue to be, a
prerequisite for holding elective office in the Nation.28 As a result of the
proposed restructuring, then, out of the Dawes Rolls’ mixed taxonomy of
race and law—“native Cherokees” and “adopted” citizens of various
“bloods” and marital statuses—there would emerge a new race-based
hierarchy of the Cherokee polity, with “Indians by blood” as its citizenry
and “Cherokees by blood” as its leadership.29
The impending vote to impose a “blood” requirement for citizenship,
with the consequence that, if passed, hundreds if not thousands of African
Americans in the tribe would be expelled, and thousands more precluded
from citizenship, signals that the Cherokee Nation may be entering a crisis
of political identity. The risks to tribal sovereignty are real: if the Cherokee
26

See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.
28
“The only time a legal right, under Cherokee law, depends on Cherokee blood, is
when a person decides to run for elected office. In that instance, we rely on the blood
degree findings of the Dawes Commission to make sure our Principal Chief and Council
members are Cherokee citizens by blood. That guarantees Cherokee control of
government, but that government is ultimately elected by a larger and more diverse
constituency of citizens.” Lucy Allen, at 9.
29
Cognizant of the terms of the proposed amendment and its impact on Cherokee
citizenship, throughout this Article the phrase “Indians by blood rolls” or “blood rolls”
refers to those Dawes Rolls which list Cherokees by blood (adults and minors), Shawnees,
and Delawares.
27
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Nation acts to expel “its Freedmen”30 the Nation and its leadership may
suffer severe reputational damages as a politically regressive and even racist
enclave. Already Oklahoma State Senator Judy Eason McIntyre and
Representative Jabar Shumate have written an "open letter" to Chief Smith,
alleging that his support of a blood quantum requirement and expulsion of
the Freedmen’s descendents would create a "racist-based" citizenship
system.31 The Cherokee lay advocate who represented Lucy Allen before
the JAT, David Cornsilk, has said of Smith, simply, “he’s a racist.”32
The perception that race is driving the issue of citizenship could only
be enhanced by statements like those of former Cherokee Nation Deputy
Chief, John Ketcher, who toured local Oklahoma communities in the
summer of 2006 to collect signatures on a petition calling for a special
election on the citizenship status of Freedmen’s descedents. In community
meetings with tribal members, Ketcher said:
We've always been people with Native American blood. People
now want to come in because in the past some Cherokees held
slaves. After the Civil War, as part of a treaty, we were forced to
accept the Freedmen. It was done by the government to punish
us. We are trying to rectify this and allow Cherokee people to
vote on Cherokee membership.33
Ketcher would accept admitting Freedmen’s descendants who could
establish their “Indian blood.” As reported in the Cherokee Phoenix, the
Nation’s paper of record, Ketcher “believes most Cherokee citizens have no
problem with black citizens who have Cherokee blood or have blood from
another tribe. ‘I think the majority of the Cherokees would probably vote to
have those Freedman who are part Cherokee to be citizens and rightfully
so,’ Ketcher said.”34 To Freedmen’s descendents like Marilyn Vann,
30

The designation of “Freedmen” has been challenged by legal scholar Natsu Saito
who argues that the term, as applied to the Seminoles of African descent, “implies that they
were enslaved until freedom was bestowed upon them by an outsider or governmental
source.” Natsu Taylor Saito, From Slavery and Seminoles to AIDS in South Africa: An
Essay on Race and Property in International Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1135, 1173 (2000).
31
Cherokee Leader Disputes Racially-tinged Allegations from Black Lawmakers,
Native American Times, April 5, 2006, available at www.nativetimes.com (subscription)
(last visited August 16, 2006); Cherokee Chief Criticized for Stance on Freedmen, supra
note 17.
32
Chief Not Ready to End Fight to Keep Out Freedmen, Muskogee Phoenix, March
16, 2006, available at http://www.aaanativearts.com/article1323.html (last visited August
16, 2006). In rejecting such an accusation, Principal Chief Smith said, “[It] is clear is that
the Cherokee Nation Constitution is not based on race. People of many different ethnic
backgrounds, African Americans, white Americans and Hispanic Americans, have
Cherokee ancestors on the Dawes Roll; and they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee
Nation citizenship. However, someone will undoubtedly play the race card in this debate.
The issue at hand is what classes of people should be citizens of the Cherokee Nation and
who should make that decision, the courts or the Cherokee people themselves.” Freedmen
Statement, supra note 17.
33
Freedmen Debate Spreads to Communities, supra note 17.
34
Id.

10

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

[20-Aug-06

Ketcher’s reliance on “Indian blood” as the sine qua non of citizenship
surely sounded like reliance on a racial criterion aimed at eliminating
African-descended citizens from the Nation.35
The recent example of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma also looms: in
2000 the Seminoles attempted to amend their constitution to impose a blood
quantum requirement that would have excluded Freedmen’s descendents
from tribal citizenship. They did not submit the amendments to the BIA for
approval, as required by their constitution.36 In 2001 the Seminoles relied
on the unapproved amendments to conduct tribal elections for chief and
council, thus disenfranchising Freedmen’s descendents. The BIA refused to
recognize the Nation’s newly-elected leadership, and after a suit brought by
the tribe, a federal district court agreed with the BIA.37 The crisis was
resolved only after the Seminoles dropped the blood quantum requirement
and the affected Freedmen’s bands held new elections.38 Although the legal
posture of the two tribes differs greatly (the 1999 Cherokee Constitution
does not require federal approval of its amendments, the Seminole
Constitution did; Cherokee Freedmen’s descendants will be allowed to vote
on their nation’s citizenship amendment, Seminole Freedmen’s
descendents’ votes though cast were not counted), it is entirely conceivable
that a federal court would finds grounds for intervention into Cherokee
governmental affairs, perhaps by an expansive reading of the Indian Civil

35

Vann countered by holding her own community meetings. Vann “said the Freedmen
want to retain citizenship rights they have had for more than 140 years, and many of them
have Indian blood with the documents to prove it. ‘Freedmen for the most part are
Cherokee people who had rights before by treaty and under the 1975 and 1999
constitutions,’ she said. Vann claims the Cherokee Nation has citizens on its rolls including
Delawares, Shawnees and whites, but the council has not denied their rights to Cherokee
citizenship. ‘The Nation was built by not just Cherokees, but by Freedmen, Delawares and
Shawnees,’ she said. ‘Now the council is saying, “we don't need them anymore.”’” Id. In
fact, Keeler’s allowance for descendents of Dawes enrollees who have “blood from another
tribe” would permit citizenship for adopted Shawnees and Delawares: it is a criterion based
on “Indian blood” which would only exclude descendents of Freemen and intermarried
whites who lacked demonstrable indigenous ancestry. See supra notes 26-29 and
accompanying text.
36
The Seminole Nation unsuccessfully challenged the authority of the Department of
the Interior to review and approve the amendments to the Seminole constitution. See
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton, 206 F.R.D. 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding DOI
has authority, pursuant to Article XIII of the Seminole Constitution, to approve
amendments to the Seminole Constitution before they could be adopted and stating “DOI
clearly expressed the basis for its objection to these amendments, pointing out that the
Freedmen have been members of the Seminole Nation since 1866 and that their removal
would violate both statute and treaty.").
37
Seminole Nation v. Norton, 223 F. Supp 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2002) (upholding action of
Secretary of the Interior to refuse recognition of newly-elected tribal government where
votes of Freedmen’s descendents were not counted, and otherwise eligible citizens were
prevented from running for office because of unlawful amendments to Seminole
constitution).
38
See letter from Neal A. McCaleb, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs, to Seminole
Chief
Jerry
G.
Haney,
December
19,
2003,
http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/mccaleb121902.pdf (last visited August 16, 2006).
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Rights Act, viewing expulsion of Freedmen’s descendents as prohibited
“banishment,” and thus triggering action under ICRA.39
The political crisis of the Cherokee Nation also signals a crisis of social
identity: what makes one a Cherokee? Indeed, the latter question underlies
the political options of blood or base rolls, because how voters in 2007 will
determine tribal citizenship criteria will depend upon how they variously
recognize—and define—their fellow Cherokees. In the following section I
will look at how one primary means of definition, namely, legal status has
defined the Cherokee Freedmen and circumscribed their rights.40
B. Cherokee Identity: Legal Definitions and their Limits
Legal definitions play a prominent though not exclusive role in
deciding Indian status. The object of definition may be collective (what is a
tribe?) or individual (who is an Indian?) and may be determined outside a
tribe (by a state or the federal government) or within a tribe (through tribal
citizenship criteria).41 The history of the Cherokee Freedmen demonstrates,
however, that legal definitions of citizenship that appear race-neutral (or
more precisely, race-inclusive) have operated to enforce normative
conceptions of the Cherokee Nation as a tribe properly by and for only
persons possessing “Indian blood.”
1.

Collective Definitions: The Cherokee Nation

The Cherokee Nation is one of three federally-recognized Cherokee
governments, the others being the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
(composed of descendents of Cherokees who did not remove to Indian
Territory in the 1830s) and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians (situated in northeastern Oklahoma and Arkansas and consisting of
Cherokee cultural traditionalists).42 Not bounded by a reservation, the
39

See Angela Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript available from author) (advocating against expansion of ICRA or similar laws
that would impede tribal self-governance); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 4.01[2][b] (2005 ed.) (“[T]he Department of the Interior has taken the position that it may
decline to continue government-to-government relations with a tribe’s elected officials if it
finds that the tribal membership laws underlying voter eligibility for the election violate
[ICRA] or the tribe’s own constitution.”).
40
In her study of Native American identity formation, Eva Garroutte, herself a citizen
of the Cherokee Nation, sets out four, competing definitions through which individuals and
communities negotiate Indian identity. Garroutte’s definitions of legal, biological, cultural,
and self-identification identity formation are highly useful in understanding the forms of
Native American self-identity. See EVA MARIE GARROUTTE, REAL INDIANS: IDENTITY AND
THE SURVIVAL OF NATIVE AMERICA 14-98 (2003).
41
See id. at 14-37 (on the definition of Indian identity by law).
42
RUSSELL THORNTON, THE CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 138-43 (1990). In
the absence of direct congressional action, which is rare, collective legal definitions of
Indians today result from the Federal Acknowledgment Process (FAP). The FAP requires a
tribe to show its historical continuity, political and communal integrity, and application of
citizenship criteria that preclude members from belonging to other tribes. See 25 C.F.R. §
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Cherokee Nation exercises sovereignty across its 14-county Tribal
Jurisdictional Service Area in northeastern Oklahoma.43 Although
jeopardized by the anti-sovereignty Curtis Act in 1898,44 the Cherokee
Nation refers to the Five Civilized Tribes Act of 1906 and a key 1976
federal court decision45 to establish its legal continuity with the tribe that
walked the Trail of Tears in 1838-39. The Act of 1906 states that tribal
governments “are hereby continued in full force and effect for all purposes
authorized by law.”46 In the words of Chief Smith in 2006 during an
occasion celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Act of 1906, “There is a
great myth that the [Five] tribes went away when Oklahoma became a state.
We have to remind ourselves and our neighbors that the five tribes have
continued in full force and effect through this entire last century.”47 Smith
reinforced the point following the Lucy Allen decision, when he stated:
Regardless of one’s point of view, the Lucy Allen case
reinforces the principle that the constitutional government of the
Cherokee Nation is the same constitutional government formed
in 1839. It properly destroys the falsehood that there is a new
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma created in 1975 and an older
Cherokee Nation with a constitution dated 1839. There is only
one constitutional government of the Cherokee people since
1839 and that simply is Cherokee Nation. The claim of
Freedmen citizenship goes back to the 1866 amendment to the
1839 Cherokee Nation Constitution.48
83.7 (Mandatory Criteria for Federal Acknowledgement). A federally-recognized tribe
receives the privileges and immunities incident to a government-to-government
relationship with the United States. See Procedures for Establishing That an American
Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe (25 C.F.R. § 83.2) (1994). The Eastern Band has
enjoyed federal recognition since 1889. The United Keetoowah Band (UKB) organized
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of
1936 and received federal recognition in 1950. The UKB self-describes as the “First
Federally Recognized Tribe in Oklahoma,”
http://www.unitedkeetoowahband.org/Documents/KeetoowahHistoryBooklet.pdf (last
visited August 16, 2006). The Cherokee Nation would “awaken” its tribal government in
the 1970s. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
43
Cherokee Nation, Demographics,
http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=demographics (last visited August 16, 2006).
44
See discussion infra, notes 49, 51, 78 and accompanying text.
45
See 34 Stat. 137 (April 26, 1906) (“Five Tribes Act”) and Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F.
Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976). In a decision focused on the Creek Nation but applicable to all
the Five Tribes, the court ruled, “despite the general intentions of the Congress of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to ultimately terminate the tribal government of the
Creeks, and despite an elaborate statutory scheme implementing numerous intermediate
steps toward that end, the final dissolution of the Creek tribal government created by the
Creek Constitution of 1867 was never statutorily accomplished, and indeed that
government was instead explicitly perpetuated.” Id. at 1118.
46
34 Stat. 137 (April 26, 1906) sec. 28.
47
5 Tribes Meet to Commemorate Historical Act, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian
Advocate, June 2006, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=phoenix&year=2006
(last visited August 16, 2006).
48
Freedmen Statement, supra note 17.
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A dramatic effect of the Curtis Act, however, was to deny the Nation
the right to exercise autonomously its inherent sovereignty.49 After the
Curtis Act, the Cherokee Nation continued to exercise minimal
governmental functions, but especially after the creation of the State of
Oklahoma on November 16, 1907, the Nation and its leadership became
instruments of the federal government for many years—Cherokees
frequently speak of the period from the Curtis Act to 1970 as one when the
Nation was “sleeping.” As Keetoowah Cherokee Robert Conley has written
of the period following the Curtis Act, “Although nothing in the law
prohibited Cherokees from electing their chief and council, a regime of
bureaucratic imperialism had begun. For all practical purposes, the
Cherokee nation had become dormant.”50 Cherokee sovereignty finally
awakened in 1970, roused in large part by President Richard Nixon’s
watershed repudiation of the federal policy of tribal termination
(“termination is morally and legally unacceptable”) and endorsement of a
policy of tribal self-determination.51 Congress, responding to President
Nixon, quickly passed legislation giving tribes back the authority to elect
their own leaders.52
Between 1970 and 1999, the Nation’s population rose from 40,000 to
over 200,000; while once concentrated almost exclusively in Oklahoma,
citizens today span the country with significant concentrations in Arkansas,
Texas and California.53 Since 1971, the Cherokee Nation has emerged as a
model of Indian economic and cultural self-determination. By its own
financial indicators, the Nation is enjoying strong growth in revenues
generated in part by Cherokee Nation Enterprises (CNE), a diversified
business wholly-owned by the tribe.54 CNE paid dividends of $15.0 million
49

See Eric Lamont, Overcoming the Politics of Reform: The Story of the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention, AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 6 (2003-2004)
(“From 1907 through 1970, the Cherokee Nation functioned without a government. During
this time, the U.S. Government appointed a Principal Chief, who did little more than
approve leases and sign documents transferring out the last of the allotments.”).
50
ROBERT J. CONLEY, THE CHEROKEE NATION: A HISTORY 202 (2005). The United
Keetoowah Band (UKB) and the Nation have often clashed over Cherokee identity. See the
history of the Keetoowah at the Band’s official website:
http://www.unitedkeetoowahband.org/Documents/History/Essay1.htm (last visited August
16, 2006) (“[T]he Keetoowahs have always been known to be the most traditional and
conservative of the Cherokee, holding on to the old ways of the full-blood Cherokee.
Legends say that if these ways ever discontinue, the Cherokee will be no more.”).
51
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 8, 1970), in DAVID H.
GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS
th
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 218-20, 219 (5 ed. 2005). The legal basis for the resurgence of
Cherokee tribal sovereignty had been laid years earlier, with the repeal of the Curtis Act by
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, which permitted tribes, inter alia, to adopt
constitutions. 49 Stat. 1967(June 25, 1936) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §501 et seq.).
52
Principal Chiefs Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-495, 84 Stat. 1091.
53
Lamont, supra note 49, at 19.
54
Data on the Cherokee Nation in this paragraph and the next, except where otherwise
indicated, are found in Cherokee Nation Status Report 2005, www.cherokee.org (follow
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into the Nation’s discretionary budget in 2005, up from $1.9 million in
1998. CNE employed 2811 people in 2005, compared with 511 in 1998.
Cherokee Nation Industries (CNI), a second corporation wholly-owned by
the Nation, was started 35 years ago and today focuses on high-tech
aerospace and military assembly. CNI’s profits have risen from $1.6 million
in 2003 to $3.5 million in 2005.55
Between fiscal 2001 and 2004, the Nation opened two new community
health clinics which contributed to an increase of 49,000 patient visits, and
made plans to open three more clinics in neighboring towns. As federal
funding for health care is decreasing, the Nation’s contribution to health
services for tribal citizens is rising: from $49 million in fiscal year 2000, to
$76 million in fiscal 2004. In the 1997-98 academic year, the Nation
supported 722 higher education scholarships for the Nation’s citizens; in
2004-05, the number had grown to 2147. Under Chief Smith’s leadership,
the Nation has made a sustained and successful effort to revitalize Cherokee
language study and renew traditional cultural activities and awareness,
especially among Cherokee youth.56 Today the Nation is widely recognized
as a model of economic success and accounting integrity as well as a leader
in innovative and effective cultural programming.57
Ironically, the revival of the Cherokee Nation was assisted by the same
constituency that is now facing expulsion. Conley writes that “[i]n 1971, the
Cherokee Nation held its first election for Principal Chief since before
Oklahoma statehood in 1907. . . . Voter eligibility was determined by the
Dawes Rolls.” Among the citizens whose eligibility was determined by the
Dawes Rolls and who cast votes in that first election were descendents of
the Nation’s Freedmen.58

“Government” hyperlink; then follow “Executive” hyperlink; then follow “Status Report”
hyperlink) (last visited August 16, 2006).
55
CNI recently suffered losses of an estimated $6.3 million due to investments in
failed or failing energy ventures. The SEC is investigating allegations of fraud in
connection with the stock purchases. Cherokee Nation Businesses Losing Millions, July 28,
2006, http://indianz.com/News/2006/015180.asp (last visited August 16, 2006).
56
See, e.g., Cherokee Nation, Status Report 2005, Cherokee Speakers Sweep Youth
Language Fair, http://www.cherokee.org/home.aspx?section=demographics.
57
See, e.g., twelve awards of the Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in
Financial Reporting by the Government Financial Officers Association and multiple
awards by the Honoring Nations Program of the Harvard Program for American Indian
Economic Development (for the Cherokee National Youth Choir and the Cherokee Nation
History Course); Cherokee Nation Status Report 2005, supra note 54 (GFOA awards);
HPAIED
Honoring
Nations
Directory,
(last
visited
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/documents/HN_Directory_99-03.pdf
August 16, 2006) (Honoring Nations awards).
58
CIRCE STURM, BLOOD POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE
NATION OF OKLAHOMA 178 (2002). The re-enfranchisement of the Freedmen’s
descendents in 1971 was to be short-lived. In the 1983 tribal election, black-Cherokees like
the Reverend Roger H. Nero who appeared at the polls were shocked to be informed that
they could not vote: the tribe had determined that voter eligibility would be limited to
Dawes Rolls descendents who possessed Indian blood. Id. See discussion infra at notes 9294 and accompanying text.
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2. Individual Definitions: Citizenship in the Cherokee Nation
Individual legal definitions of Indians are determined by the tribes
themselves or, in some circumstances, by Congress.59 The United States
Supreme Court in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo upheld the right of tribes
to determine their own criteria for citizenship consistent with retained tribal
sovereignty and Congress’s intent to promote Indian self-government.60
Except where Congress has acted to abridge their authority, tribes may
determine their criteria for citizenship, even where, as in Martinez, the
result disadvantages a class that would be protected under the federal
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee, were it applicable.61 Martinez
implicitly authorizes a host of different tribal citizenship-criteria: “blood
quantum” is a common though not universal criterion; others include
maternal or paternal descent, residency on the reservation, community
participation, vote of the tribal council, community recognition or parental
enrollment, performance of certain annual duties to the tribe, appearance of
ancestors on specified base rolls, and marriage to or adoption by a tribal
member.62
Once recognized as a citizen, individuals may receive numerous and
varied rights, depending upon the tribe. They may include voting rights, the
right to run for and hold tribal office, preferential hiring by the tribe, access
to tribal courts and subjection to tribal law, the right to receive tribal social
services, the right to receive revenues generated by tribally-owned
businesses, or the right to share in distributions derived from the
exploitation of natural resources on or beneath tribal lands.63
Because establishing tribal citizenship criteria is a function of a tribe’s
political process, it is subject to all the vagaries of lawmaking and those
who miss the opportunity, for example, to sign up when tribal base rolls are
established are denied, and their descendents are denied, the chance for
political participation “from the inside” unless the tribe makes an
accommodation for them. As Garroutte observes, such persons, though
perhaps culturally or biologically Native American, and desirous of an

59

Garroutte observes that “[a] 1978 congressional survey discovered no less than
thirty-three separate definitions of Indians in use in different pieces of federal legislation.
These may or may not correspond with those any given tribe uses to determine its
citizenship.” GARROUTTE, supra note 40, at 16 (emphasis in original).
60
46 U.S. 49 (1978).
61
Id. In Martinez, the disadvantaged class was women. The federal Constitution does
not apply to federally-recognized Indian tribes except to the extent required by the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Significantly, Martinez held that federal courts’ power to review
claims arising under ICRA was limited to the right of habeus corpus. See supra at note 49
and accompanying text.
62
GARROUTTE, supra note 40, at 15. See Christine Metteer, The Trust Doctrine,
Sovereignty, and Membership: Determining Who Is Indian, 5 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
53, 86 (2003) (arguing “tribes must be allowed to retain their various membership criteria
because these criteria for determining who is and who is not a member are a statement of
what makes the tribe unique.”).
63
See GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 15-18 (various rights incident to tribal citizenship).
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“official” Indian identity, are legally “not ‘real Indians.’ They are
‘outaluck.’”64
The former slaves of Cherokees were legally defined as tribal citizens
when the Cherokee Nation signed a reconstruction treaty with the United
States on July 19, 1886. By its terms, the Treaty of 1866 provided in
relevant part that:
[A]ll freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their
former owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who
were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and
are now residents therein, or who may return within six months,
and their descendents shall have the rights of native Cherokees.65
In consequence of the Treaty, the Cherokee Nation promptly amended its
Constitution:
Art. 3, Sec. 5 . . . All native-born Cherokees, all Indians, and
whites legally members of the nation by adoption, and all
freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of their
former owners or by law, as well as free colored persons who
were in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and
are now residents therein, or who may return within six months
from the 19th day of July, 1866, and their descendents who reside
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, shall be taken and
deemed to be citizens of the Cherokee Nation.66
Rather than settle the issue of the Freedmen’s legal status, however, the
Treaty of 1866 and constitutional amendments of 1866 “set in motion what
proved to be a torturous effort to determine precisely who qualified for the
tribal rolls.”67 The confluence of the Treaty’s and Constitution’s six-month
deadline for establishing residency, the dispersion of former slaves
throughout the region due to war, and limited means of communicating vital
information meant that many former slaves did not return in time to receive
tribal citizenship—they were “outaluck”—and entered Cherokee history as
the “too-lates”:
The treaty specified that former slaves desiring Cherokee
citizenship should present themselves by January 1867. During
the war, however, many Cherokee slaves had fled the territory or
64

Id. at 22. The term “outalucks,” coined by historian Kent Carter, refers to “people of
Indian ancestry who are nevertheless unable to negotiate their identity as Indians within the
available legal definitions.” Id. at 14 (citing Kent Carter, “Wantabees and Outalucks,” 66
CHRONICLES OF OKLAHOMA 94-101 [1988]).
65
2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 944 (Charles J. Kappler, ed. 1904-1941;
1975-76 printing).
66
CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, § 5 (amended 1866).
67
ANDREW DENSON, DEMANDING THE CHEROKEE NATION: INDIAN AUTONOMY AND
AMERICAN CULTURE 1830-1900 84 (2004).
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had been taken out by their owners, and some freed people who
otherwise qualified did not make it back in time.68
The challenge facing the Freedmen of establishing Cherokee social
identities under the circumstances of reconstruction were exacerbated by the
early and sustained opposition of the Cherokee leadership to their legal
identity as citizens.69 As anthropologist Circe Sturm observed in 2002,
“Despite the promises of this treaty [of 1866], the freedmen were never
fully accepted as citizens of the Cherokee Nation, and Cherokees to this day
remain divided over the political and legal status of their former slaves.”70
The matter of “black access to tribal resources” quickly became a focal
point of Cherokee resistance to Freedmen’s citizenship.71 Sturm notes that
“[i]n an attempt to solidify their own economic and political interests, in
1883 the Cherokee tribal council passed legislation that excluded the
freedmen and other tribal citizens without Cherokee blood, such as the
Shawnees, Delawares, and intermarried whites, from sharing in tribal
assets,” such as those realized from the sale of tribal lands.72 Cherokee
politicians argued that the Freedmen and their descendents had only the
right of occupancy, not ownership of tribal lands, and therefore were not
entitled to share in the distribution of any sale proceeds absent the Council’s
permission.73
68

Id. Denson adds that “[o]thers had trouble proving that they had been Cherokee
slaves, while some of those claiming citizenship had never been owned by Cherokees but
had migrated to the Indian Territory after the war in hopes of securing land.” Id. The
confluence of slavery, war, and treaty law hit families especially hard. To reach the
territory in time, some parents left behind spouses and children, and if the families were
reunited after the six-month window had closed, federal agents could treat the late arrivals
as territorial intruders and expel them. Children who had been separated from their families
during slavery and sold often could not be reunited in time. Some minors had been bound
to service until their majority; they too could not return in time to establish their
citizenship. See MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION,
1838-1907 226 (1938; 1977) (citing 1870 report of Captain John Craig, a federal agent for
the Cherokees, that “not a few [former slaves] were detained in slavery in Texas for one or
two years after the war, or until they escaped.”).The harsh effects of the original deadline
were partially mitigated in 1870 by amendments permitting slaves who had resided “in the
Nation in 1861 to receive an allotment and citizenship whenever they returned to Indian
Territory.” PERDUE, SLAVERY AND THE EVOLUTION OF CHEROKEE SOCIETY, 1540-1866 143
(1979).
69
See KATJA MAY, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE CREEK AND
CHEROKEE NATIONS, 1830S TO 1920S 71 (1996) (“From 1866 to 1876 freedmen could vote
and serve on juries. . . . After 1877 [and the election of traditionalist Principal Chief
Oochalata], the exercise of citizenship rights became difficult.”).
70
STURM, supra note 58, at 171. The political history of Freedmen’s citizenship after
the Civil War, which I summarize in this section, unless otherwise indicated, is found id. at
170-78.
71
DENSON, supra note 67 at 85 (“Economic factors tended to drive the freedmen
controversy.”).
72
STURM, supra note 58 at 171.
73
MAY, supra note 69, at 71. The irony of this position, of course, consists in its
application of the same principles of Euroamerican property law used by the Marshall
Court when it held tribes did not hold absolute title to aboriginal lands, only a right of
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Congress responded, and passed legislation in 1888 that “required the
tribe to share its assets equally with the freedmen and other adopted
citizens.”74 To foster compliance with the law and rationalize the
distribution of tribal assets, Congress called for an enrollment of all eligible
Freedmen by a federal agent. In 1889, the agent produced the Wallace Roll,
a record of 3,524 Freedmen or their descendents.
The Nation continued to resist the legal definition of Freedmen as
Cherokee Nation citizens, prompting Congress in 1890 to authorize
adjudication of the Nation’s obligations to the Freedmen in the Court of
Claims. In Whitmire v. Cherokee Nation and the United States75 the Court
of Claims ruled in favor of the Freedmen, holding that the grant of rights to
Freedmen and their descendents by the Cherokee Nation under its
Constitution (amended 1866), consistent with the Nation’s obligations
under the Treaty of 1866, precluded the Nation from denying the Freedmen
an equal share in the distribution of proceeds from the sale of communallyowned land:
When the Cherokee people wrote into their constitution in 1866
“all nativeborn Cherokees, all Indians and whites legally
members of the nation by adoption, and all freedmen,” “shall be
taken and been deemed to be citizens of the Cherokee Nation,”
they fixed the status of the freedman and raised him to the same
rank of citizenship which they themselves enjoyed. Thenceforth
he was to be equal with themselves under the constitution,
governed by the same laws, enjoying the same rights, possessed
of the same immunities, and entitled to the same protection.76
The Court of Claims awarded the Freedmen $903,365 as their share of
$7,240,000 that had been realized from tribal land sales. However, because
the Nation had already distributed the entire amount to Cherokees by blood,
and the United States was named as co-defendant, it fell to the federal
government to pay the Freedmen. Not satisfied with the accuracy of the
Wallace Roll, the government authorized a second recording, called the
Kern-Clifton Roll, which was finished in 1896 and listed 5,600 Freedmen or
their descendents. Based on the Kern-Clifton Roll, the federal government
satisfied the Whitmire judgment and awarded the legally-defined Cherokee
Freedmen shares of profits from the sale of their tribal lands.
occupancy, in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). On Johnson as a
foundational case for United States legal colonization of Native Americans, see ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 51-58 (2005).
74
STURM, supra note 58, at 171; see 25 Stat. at L. 608-609.
75
30 Ct. Cl. 138 (1895).
76
Id. Counsel for the Cherokee Nation distinguished between the Freedmen’s “rights
in the soil” (and proceeds of its sale), which they vigorously resisted conceding, and
Freedmen’s “right to vote, to sit on juries, to sue and be sued, to receive the benefits of
public schools and charities,” which they readily acknowledged “has never been questioned
or abridged in the slightest.” Id. (page cites unavailable).
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The Freedmen’s rights to Cherokee Nation citizenship were defined
once more when the federal government forced a new accounting on the
Five Tribes in 1893, in furtherance of the General Allotment Act of 1887
(popularly known as the Dawes Act). The policy of the federal government
in the nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries to assimilate Native
Americans into the culture and ethos of non-Indian society included, at its
heart, the inculcation of a love of private property, the sine qua non of
“civilized” peoples. The Dawes Act called for the break-up of triballyowned land into individual allotments and their award in severalty to
individual Indians and other qualified tribal members, including the
Freedmen and their descendents. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1901
called the Dawes Act “a mighty, pulverizing engine to break up the tribal
mass,”77 seeing in its effects the end of tribal communities themselves and
the assimilation of their members into mainstream, farming America, thus
freeing the federal government of the anachronism of sovereign Indian
nations and ending the federal trust responsibility to their members. The
Dawes Act, and its politically potent successor the Curtis Act,78 represent
the legal embodiment of the philosophical aspiration expressed in 1892 by
the founder of the Carlisle Indian School, Colonel Richard Pratt, who stated
that “all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in
him, and save the man.”79
Significantly, the Dawes Act introduced the use of “blood quantum”—
degrees of “Indian blood”—as a metric for alienability of allotments. On the
theory that “full-blooded” Indians were less familiar with property
ownership and therefore less competent to manage their affairs, Congress
required that the land of any allottee of one-half degree “Indian blood” or
more would be held in trust for a determined number of years, could not be
sold, and would not be taxed; allotments to those with less than one-halfdegree “Indian blood” (including intermarried whites and Freedmen and

77

President Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message, December 3, 1901,
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/native_voices/voices_display.cfm?id=92 (last visited
August 16, 2006).
78
See discussion supra at notes 44, 49-51 and accompanying text. The Curtis Act of
1898 accelerated the federal government’s attack on tribal sovereignty. As legal scholar
David E. Wilkins states:
With this act, Congress unilaterally and indirect violation of treaty and
statutory law, terminated the legal existence of the Five Civilized Tribes. This
detailed measure provided for the establishment and regulation of townsites;
for the management of leases of Indian mineral rights; authorized the Dawes
Commission to create enrollment lists which would serve as the basis for
deciding who received land allotments; prohibited the expansion of lands; and
also abolished the court systems of the tribal governments in Indian territory.
. . . [The Five Tribes were reduced] to a poverty status that would take
decades for them to rise above.
DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE
MASKING OF JUSTICE 66-67 (1997).
79
“Kill the Indian, and Save the Man”: Capt. Richard C. Pratt on the Education of
Native Americans, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/4929/ (last visited August 16, 2006).

20

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

[20-Aug-06

their descendents) were subject to taxation but their owners could freely
alienate their property.80
In 1893 Congress created the Dawes Commission and charged it with
negotiating with the Five Tribes for the end of communal land ownership.
New rolls were needed to determine who should receive allotments of land.
Sturm states that after initial resistance to allotment, the governments of the
Five Tribes gave in and the Commission’s agents “began taking oral and
written testimony from applicants for tribal enrollment”:
The final rolls of the Five Tribes were to list newborns, minors,
and adults in three racial categories—freedmen, intermarried
whites, and Indians by blood, with only the latter specifying an
Indian blood quantum. Sensing an opportunity to reverse the
inroads the freedmen were making in the courts, the Cherokee
Nation attempted to frustrate the enrollment of the freedmen,
who may have been citizens by law but were not accepted in the
minds of the majority.81
A set number of acres per allottee, multiplied by the number of eligible
allottees as determined by the Dawes Rolls, subtracted from the tribe’s land
base, invariably yielded unallotted acres of tribal land. Under the Dawes
Act, however, this “excess land” was not held in trust for the tribes; instead,
it was opened to non-Indian settlement.82
When the Dawes Commission completed its work in 1907, and
prepared to parcel out allotments of land to Indians by blood, intermarried
whites, and Freedmen or their descendents, the final rolls of the Cherokee
Nation as approved by the Secretary of the Interior “contained the names of
41,798 citizens of whom 8,698 were [Cherokee] full-bloods. There were
31,400 Cherokees by blood, 197 registered Delaware-Cherokees, 286
intermarried whites, 4,991 Cherokee minors, 4,305 freedmen, and 619
Cherokee freedmen minors.”83
Because the Cherokee Nation today requires that prospective tribal
citizens establish an ancestor on the Dawes Rolls, the Dawes Rolls have
exclusive authority over the legal definition of who is a Cherokee.84
80

STURM, supra note 58, at 79.
Id. at 173.
82
ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED
TRIBES 23 (1940).
83
WARDELL, supra note 68, at 333.
84
The Cherokee Nation’s citizenship eligibility process provides: “To be eligible for
CDIB/Tribal Citizenship with the Cherokee Nation, you must be able to provide documents
that connect you to an enrolled lineal ancestor, who is listed on the (DAWES ROLL)
FINAL ROLLS OF CITIZENS AND FREEDMEN OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES,
Cherokee Nation. This roll was taken between 1899-1906 of Citizens and Freedmen
residing in Indian Territory (now NE Oklahoma). Many applicants do not qualify for
CDIB/Citizenship as their ancestors did not meet the enrollment requirements and were not
enrolled. Certain requirements had to be met in order to be placed on the Dawes Roll.”
Cherokee Nation Registration Office, www.cherokee.org (follow “Services” hyperlink;
then follow “Registration” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16, 2006). “CDIB” refers to a
81
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Throughout the twentieth century persons claiming to be descendents of
former Cherokee slaves whose ancestors appear on the Kern-Clifton Roll or
the Wallace Roll but not on the Dawes Rolls have fought in court to
overturn this exclusive authority and be recognized as tribal citizens
according to some other legal rubric. Their efforts have been consistently
unsuccessful.85
During the early years of the “dormition” of the Cherokee Nation,86 the
Freedmen and their descendents, along with Cherokee Indians by “blood”
and the rest of the Five Tribes, suffered the depredations of unscrupulous
land-grabbers who defrauded the new allottees at every opportunity. So
successful were these “grafters” that “by 1930 the Five-Tribes Indians
owned less than 2 million acres of land, down from a total of 19,525,966
acres in 1890.”87 In addition, Oklahoma during the early decades of the
twentieth century was marked by collective violence against African
Americans. Race riots occurred in several locations,88 including the
infamous Tulsa Riot of 1921, which took the lives of between 100 and 300
black residents and charred an estimated 1256 homes and virtually all
schools, churches, businesses, a library and a hospital in Tulsa’s black
neighborhood of Greenwood. Between 1907 and 1920, 33 black persons
were lynched in Oklahoma. During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan in
Oklahoma boasted tens of thousands of members.89 Notwithstanding these
horrific circumstances, the Freedmen and their descendents who were

Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood, issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to establish
the holder’s Indian blood quantum based on information in the Dawes Rolls. The effect of
requiring a CDIB in addition to showing an ancestor on the Dawes Rolls was to preclude
non-Indians from registering as tribal members. See discussion infra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text. After the Lucy Allen decision, the Nation created a separate
registration procedure that does not require Freedmen’s descendents to produce a CDIB but
still requires them to demonstrate their descent from an enrollee on the Freedmen’s Roll of
the
Dawes
Rolls.
See
http://www.cherokee.org/docs/registration/Freedman_Registration.pdf (last visited August
16, 2006).
85
See Cherokee Nation and United States v. Whitmire, 223 U.S. 108, 117 (1912)
(upholding the legitimacy of the Dawes Rolls over the Kern-Clifton Roll “as an authentic
identification of the individual freedmen”). For an overview of the legal history of the
Freedmen’s descendents in the twentieth century, see STURM, supra note 58, at 173-78.
86
From the Curtis Act of 1898 to President Nixon’s renunciation of termination in
1970 and Cherokee tribal elections in 1971. See discussion supra notes 44, 49-51, 78 and
accompanying text.
87
STURM, supra note 58, at 174 (citations omitted). See esp. the classic history of the
massive defrauding of the Dawes allotment recipients, DEBO, STILL THE WATERS RUN,
supra note 82, esp. 92-125 (“The Grafters’ Share”).
88
STURM, supra note 58 at 174.
89
Final Report of the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921
(2001), http://www.tulsareparations.org/FinalReport.htm (last visited August 16, 2006). On
the history of lynching as a failure to secure equal protection under the law for African
Americans, and racially motivated violence under Jim Crow, see RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 41-63 (1997).
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included on the Dawes Rolls prospered as citizens of the Cherokee
Nation.90 According to Sturm:
Despite increased violence during the first three decades of the
twentieth century, new freedmen citizens on the whole fared
better than they had in the antebellum Cherokee Nation. Ever
since allotment, they had increased civil rights and were able to
get access to the Cherokee courts, sit on juries, serve as elected
officials, have some security in their improvements, and enjoy
limited school facilities.91
The Cherokee Freedmen’s participation in the tribal elections in
1971—the first tribal election for the office of principal chief since before
the Curtis Act—and the subsequent tribal elections of 1975 may be a highwater mark in the Freedmen’s civic participation in the life of the Nation.
For by the time of the election of 1983, the Nation’s leadership had
amended the tribal code to require voters to hold a Certificate of Degree of
Indian Blood, or “CDIB,” issued by the federal government. In an
unpublished interview, former Principal Chief Ross Swimmer (who served
from 1975 to 1985) stated, according to Sturm, that:
[F]ive years earlier in 1977-78 both the voter registration
committee and the tribal membership committee registration
committee had established new rules. These rules declared that
according to the new Cherokee Constitution of 1976, an
individual must have a certificate degree of Indian blood (CDIB)
to be registered as a tribal citizen or voter.92
90

The complex realities of social prosperity and racial threat experienced in the black
towns of early Oklahoma is discussed in Phyllis E. Bernard, Oklahoma: The New Africa,
26 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 901 (2001). See also Peter Wallenstein, Native Americans Are
White, African Americans Are Not: Racial Identity, Marriage, Inheritance, and the Law in
Oklahoma, 1907-1967, 39 JOURNAL OF THE WEST 55-63, 56 (2000) (“Oklahoma law
defined as nonwhite only residents who had African ancestry. . . . [W]hile whites came to
dominate, Indians moved into middle position.”). Oklahoma laws prohibited interracial
marriage between blacks and whites until they were struck down consistent with Loving in
1967. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
91
STURM, supra note 58, at 174.
92
Id. at 178. Because elections are held every four years, the change in voter
eligibility in 1977-78 means the Freedmen’s descendents would only have been permitted
to vote in the 1971 and 1975 elections. In part because the Freedmen were not permitted to
vote in the 2003 referendum on the 1999 Constitution, the BIA refused to approve the
document. However, the 1999 Constitution removed the textual provision of the 1975
Constitution calling for federal approval of constitutional changes, and on June 7, 2006, the
JAT ruled in a 2-1 decision that due to the tribe’s inherent sovereignty the new Constitution
received all necessary approvals when it was passed by the voters. See JAT Rules 2003
Constitution Law, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian Advocate, June 2006, www.cherokee.org
(follow “Phoenix” hyperlink; then follow “Archives” hyperlink”) (last visited August 16,
2006);
Comparison
of
the
1976
and
1999
Constitutions,
(last
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc1999Changes.pdf
visited August 16, 2006). The exclusion of the Freedmen from the 2003 referendum
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The introduction of this requirement—possession of a federally-issued
CDIB—into the formal criteria for Cherokee Nation citizenship in 1977-78
marked the first time since the Treaty of 1866 that the Nation had officially
predicated citizenship on biology: proof of “Indian blood” was now
required for tribal citizenship.93 The Dawes Rolls were effectively
attenuated to “Indian blood”-based categories only, and in subsequent
elections, Freedmen’s descendents were turned back from the polls.94
3. The Limits of Legal Definitions of Citizenship
The history of the Cherokee Freedmen presented above only begins to
touch on the complex relationship between the Cherokee Nation in
reconstruction and a victorious United States. It does not do justice to the
Nation’s fight against the insatiable demands of white settlers for
“unoccupied” Cherokee land in Indian Territory, the consequent loss of
much of the tribal land base through allotment and fraud, and the harsh
impact of decades-long government policies, both federal and state, aimed
at cultural assimilation and elimination of tribal sovereignty. The revival of
the Cherokee Nation in the early 1970s should be understood as the political
reawakening of a proud indigenous community. As former Principal Chief
Wilma Mankiller (1985-95) has said of this period, “The tribal power base
was dominated by men, but it was refreshing to see that at least a rebirth of
our government, which the federal government had tried to suppress for
seventy years, was in full swing.”95 Yet the history sketched above reveals
limitations on the capability of legal definitions to provide a coherent
Cherokee identity today for all of the Nation’s citizens.
When the Freedmen were adopted into the Nation by the Treaty of
1866, they enjoyed in theory all the legal benefits of citizenship. Indeed, the
Nation’s amendment of its Constitution that year indicates the tribe’s intent
to confer those benefits on its former slaves and their descendents.
However, no sooner were economic resources available than the tribe began
to protest the inclusion of the Freedmen in their distribution, discriminating
between political rights as citizens (which the tribe readily acknowledged
belonged to the Freedmen) and economic rights that pertained only to
“native Cherokees.” Time and again in the late 1800s, Congress and courts
were called upon to enforce the economic rights of Freedmen and other
“adopted” Cherokees. When confronted with the terms of the Treaty of
1866, the tribe countered that the Treaty was forced upon it, so its
sparked a lawsuit by Freedmen’s descendents, including Marilyn Vann, against the United
States (the Cherokee Nation intervened) which remains pending. Complaint, Vann v.
Norton (D.D.C.), August 11, 2003, http://www.freedmen5tribes.com/Lawsuit.htm (last
visited August 16, 2006).
93
The racial and biological underpinnings of the Dawes Rolls themselves are analyzed
infra notes 208-232 and accompanying text.
94
See supra notes 58, 92 and accompanying text.
95
WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND HER PEOPLE
217 (1993).
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obligation to adopt the Freedmen and grant citizenship to them and their
descendents should not be binding;96 an assertion the Lucy Allen majority
considered and dismissed.97 The resistance of tribal leadership to
recognizing the Cherokees’ former slaves and their descendents as
Cherokee citizens meant that roll after roll of Freedmen was drawn up to
ascertain eligible beneficiaries of financial distributions and allotments.
Though legally on the same footing as “native Cherokees,” both before and
after the Dawes Rolls, the Freedmen were never recognized by the tribe as
“real” Cherokees.
When the Nation officially reasserted itself in the early 1970s it quickly
took steps to legally exclude an already marginalized social group, the
Freedmen’s descendents, by amending the tribal code to require Dawes
Rolls-based proof of Indian “blood quantum” (the CDIB requirement). The
Nation no longer admitted, as its counsel did before the Court of Claims in
Whitmire, that the right of the Freedmen and their descendents to vote or
enjoy other political rights of citizenship “has never been questioned or
abridged in the slightest.”98 Freedmen’s descendents who protested their
exclusion have reportedly been told that “Freedmen were compensated with
allotments, unlike freed slaves in the South after the American Civil War,”99
as though they had bargained away their citizenship for land, or “Freedmen
did not help during the last 100 hundred [sic] years to rebuild the Cherokee
Nation and should not at this late date reap any benefits that Cherokees have
earned,”100 ignoring the counterpoints that either the Freedmen’s help in
96

The Lucy Allen dissent asserted that “the majority opinion fails to point out that the
Treaty of 1866 and the 1866 amendment to the 1839 Constitution of the Cherokee Nation
was a direct result of the [fact that the] 1866 Treaty was brought about by duress from the
United States Federal Government after the Cherokee Nation chose the losing side of the
Civil War. . . . My colleagues in the majority opinion have failed to cite any instance where
the Cherokee Nation voluntarily granted citizenship to the Cherokee Freedmen prior to or
after 1866.” Lucy Allen, at 29 (Darrell R. Matlock, Jr., C.J., dissenting). See also the
comments of former Cherokee Nation Deputy Chief Ketcher, supra note 33-35 and
accompanying text.
97
The majority stated that “[a]lthough this treaty was signed at the end of the Civil
War, when the Cherokee Nation was in a weaker bargaining position, it is nonetheless an
agreement between two sovereign nations. When the Cherokee Nation enters into treaties
with other nations, we expect the other sovereign to live up to the promises they make. It is
rightly expected that we will also keep the promises we make.” Lucy Allen, at 18. The
Court also reminded the Nation that “[t]he fact that internal Cherokee laws were amended
to acknowledge the Cherokee Nation’s compliance with the 1866 Treaty should not be
ignored.” Id. at 19. Elsewhere, however, the majority seems to draw back from its flat
conclusion that the Nation should “keep the promises we make,” and questions “whether
the Cherokee Nation, like other sovereigns, has the internal power to unilaterally abrogate
treaties.” Id. at 20. The majority adds in dicta that “[t]his Court sees no reason why the
Cherokee Nation must be bound by a treaty until the end of time, particularly when that
treaty has been broken by the other sovereign,” but cautions that abrogation of any treaty
must be done “by clear actions which are consistent with the Cherokee Nation
Constitution,” not by “mere implication.” Id.
98
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
99
Freedmen Statement, supra note 17.
100
Id.
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rebuilding the Nation was seldom welcomed, or Freedmen did in fact help
rebuild the Nation.101
From the above it is clear that the legal definition of Cherokee identity
since 1866 has failed to produce legitimized Cherokee social identities for
all citizens of the Nation.102 Although the legal definition of Cherokees, as
provided for by the Treaty of 1866 and the constitutional amendments of
1866, granted “native Cherokees,” Freedmen, and other adoptees
citizenship in one and the same polity, neither then nor since have
Cherokees by “blood” and Freedmen shared the same Cherokee social
identity or even compatible Cherokee social identities. My brief review of
the history of the Cherokee Nation since reconstruction indicates that each
time major financial or political opportunities have arisen, “native
Cherokees” have striven to distinguish themselves as a social subset of the
common citizenry and accrue to themselves control of these opportunities to
realize their vision of the Nation.
With the proposed amendment to the Cherokee Constitution to impose
an “Indian blood” requirement, the Cherokee Nation may be heading at last
toward an isomorphism of one set of its members’ social identities (as
biological Cherokees) and their political identity (as Cherokee citizens).
The Freedmen’s descendents would be hived off and rendered invisible
from the standpoint of the Nation’s organic document and tribal code. But
the resolution of the political crisis by legal simplification could come at a
significant social cost, not least because the public debate thus far has
avoided or disavowed the role of perhaps the most important variable of all:
race.
C. Cherokee Identity: Biological Definitions and their Limits
The Lucy Allen Court, in rejecting the validity of the tribal code’s
“Indian blood”-based citizenship criteria, distinguished the Nation as a
political sovereign from the tribe as a biologically-linked community, and in
so doing, pointed to the rich and complex network of races and societies
that have traditionally made up the Cherokee Nation’s polity:
The Cherokee nation is a Sovereign. The Cherokee Nation is
much more than just a group of families with a common
101

See, e.g., the example of Freedman’s descendent Leslie Ross whose grandfather
Stick Ross served on the Council (the “lower” half of the Cherokee legislature, the “upper”
half being the Senate), supra note 21. The roster of Cherokee Council members in the late
nineteenth century includes six who are designated as “negro” in Emmet Starr’s
authoritative history: Joseph Brown (1875), Stick Ross (1895), Ned Irons (1895) (all from
Tahlequah District); Frank Vann (1887), Samuel Stidham (1895) (both from Illinois
District); Jerry Alberty (1889) (Cooweescoowee District). EMMETT STARR, HISTORY OF
THE CHEROKEE INDIANS AND THEIR LEGENDS AND FOLKLORE 277-83 (1921; reprinted
2003).
102
See STURM, supra note 58, at 105 (“Cherokee blood policies constitute the
Cherokee Nation in a legal and political sense but . . . these legal definitions do not
correspond with sociocultural realities at the local level.”).
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ancestry. For almost 150 years, the Cherokee Nation has
included not only citizens that are Cherokee by blood, but also
citizens who have origins in other Indian nations and/or African
and/or European ancestry. Many of these citizens are mixed
race and a small minority of these citizens possess no Cherokee
blood at all.103
I advert to the Cherokee Nation’s traditionally varied racial and ethnic
composition not to argue that tribal policies should reflect the past, and
therefore efforts to amend the Constitution to impose a “blood” requirement
for citizenship are inappropriate. As a citizen of the Cherokee Nation
myself, whose citizenship will not be affected by the proposed amendment,
I agree with legal scholar Carole Goldberg that the “contemporary concerns
of tribal communities” must be the touchstone for setting citizenship
criteria, and “there is no reason to deny” the legitimacy of criteria based on
such concerns “merely because they depart from ‘traditional’ measures.”104
At the same time, clearing the field of methodological attachments to
traditions of citizenship begs the question for the Cherokee Nation’s
voters—and for no one else—of how we should evaluate biology as a
criterion for citizenship, especially where our tribal history includes slaveholding and our northeastern Oklahoma roots are still fed in significant
ways by the culture of the South.105
1.

The Construction of the “Red” Race

“Race,” Circe Sturm writes, “is not a natural, biological, or scientific
category. Instead, it is a social, historical, and political category defined in
biological terms.”106 In his important study of the construction of whiteness
as a prerequisite for United States citizenship, legal scholar Ian Haney
Lopez defines “race” as “the historically contingent social systems of
meaning that attach to elements of morphology and ancestry.” 107 Lopez

103

Lucy Allen, at 9. The Court continued: “People will always disagree on who is
culturally Cherokee and who possess enough Cherokee blood to be ‘racially’ Indian. It is
not the role of this Court to engage in these political or social debates.” Id. at 10.
104
Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian
Nations, 50 KAN. L. REV. 437, 438 (2002).
105
See STURM, supra note 58, at 14 (“Most Cherokees consider Oklahoma their home
in the fullest sense of the word, but almost all look back to the South, to their aboriginal
homeland. . . . Many never get a chance to go back, but those geographic, historical, and
cultural origins continually visit their imaginations and shape their identities in complex
ways.”).
106
Id. at 14-15.
107
IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 14
(1996). See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993)
(on evolution of whiteness as a form of racial identity to a form of property and status) and
Rebecca Tsosie, The New Challenge to Native Identity: An Essay on “Indigeneity” and
“Whiteness,” 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2005) (arguing for expansion of dialogue on
whiteness to colonialism and its global power over indigenous peoples’ resources).
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elaborates his understanding of race along three “interrelated levels, the
physical, the social, and the material’:
First, race turns on physical features and lines of descent, not
because features or lineage themselves are a function of racial
variation, but because society has invested these with racial
meanings. Second, because the meanings given to certain
features and ancestries denote race, it is the social processes of
ascribing racialized meanings to faces and forbearers that lie at
the heart of racial fabrication. Third, these meaning-systems,
while originally only ideas, gain force as they are reproduced in
the material conditions of society. The distribution of wealth
and poverty turns in part on the actions of social and legal actors
who have accepted ideas of race, with the resulting material
conditions becoming part of and reinforcement for the
contingent meanings understood as race.108
The relationship of law to race is not merely regulatory, it is productive. On
all three levels—physical, social, and material—law operates to assign
meaning to bodies and ancestry. As Lopez states, “The legal system
influences what we look like, the meanings ascribed to our looks, and the
material reality that confirms the meanings of our appearances. Law
constructs race.”109
The construction of racial identities through the dividing practices of
plantation slave-holding and resistance to it established patterns of social
interaction that would reproduce themselves long after 1866 and the end of
slavery itself. My focus in this section and the next will be on the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, when Cherokees developed their own forms of
colonial and early-American slave-holding inflected by traditional Cherokee
culture and Euroamerican notions of citizenship.110 In the process,
Cherokees reproduced and politically imbedded the practices by which
racialized meanings were assigned to the faces and forbearers of Africandescended men and women, Euroamericans, and themselves.
The construction of Cherokees as “red men” was not a self-reflexive act
of an indigenous people, but was performed by Europeans and
Euroamericans according to preexisting racial narratives, drawn from
Christian monogenetic and Enlightenment sources, which esteemed
whiteness, loathed blackness, and sought the salvation and civilization of
all.111 In 1728, for example, Virginia planter William Byrd wrote, “All
108

LOPEZ, supra note 107, at 14.
Id. at 19.
110
The early history of the social construction of African-Native American peoples is
documented in JACK D. FORBES, AFRICANS AND NATIVE AMERICANS: THE LANGUAGE OF
RACE AD THE EVOLUTION OF RED-BLACK PEOPLES (1993). See also WILLIAM LOREN
KATZ, BLACK INDIANS: A HIDDEN HERITAGE (1986) (social and political history of the
topic).
111
Scholar of ethnicity and African American studies Tiya Miles has written, “[The]
system of White supremacy was nourished by an ideology of White supremacy that
109
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Nations of men have the same Natural Dignity, and we all know that very
bright Talents may be lodg’d under a very dark Skin. The principal
Difference between one People and another proceeds only from the
different Opportunities of Improvement.”112 By the end of the 18th century,
however, “Cherokees had begun to internalize some ideas of race as
fundamental to their own identity.” 113 They had incorporated “an
understanding of racial difference and racial prejudice that articulated with
Western views. . . . [H]uman differences that Cherokees had once
understood in terms of color symbolism, culture, politics, and kinship were
now also understood in terms of race”:
Red, white, and black had become racial categories “because the
Cherokees described the origins of difference as innate, the
product of separate creations, and they spoke of skin color as if it
were a meaningful index of difference.”114
Indeed, skin color was a meaningful index of difference: Cherokees of
the late 18th century were engaged in “racial fabrication” by ascribing social
meaning to their own “faces and forbearers” (Lopez) and the physiognomy
and lineage of those around them. On some occasions, Cherokees attempted
to simultaneously accept their classification as “red” and subvert the
Euroamerican hierarchy of white over red by appealing to shared norms of
theology and longevity on the land. For example, presiding over the Treaty
of Hopewell in 1785, Cherokee chief Old Tassel reminded his American
interlocutors, “I am made of this earth, on which the great man above
placed me, to possess it. . . . You must know the red people are the
aborigines of this land, and that it is but a few years since the white people
found it out. I am of the first stock, as the commissioners know, and a
native of this land; and the white people are now living on it as our
friends.”115
At the same time, with the support of American policies of
“civilization,” Cherokees were increasingly intermarrying with
pervaded the rhetoric and writing of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English.
Historian Winthrop Jordan [argues] that the English saw Africans as ‘black,’ a description
that, for them, connoted evil, bestiality, and filth.” Tiya Miles, Uncle Tom Was an Indian:
Tracing the Red in Black Slavery, in CONFOUNDING THE COLOR LINE: THE INDIAN-BLACK
EXPERIENCE IN NORTH AMERICA 137-60, 141-42 (James F. Brooks, ed. 2002); citing
WINTHROP JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 48 (1974). On monogenesis as a theological construct, see STURM, supra
note 58, at 44.
112
THEDA PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD” INDIANS: RACIAL CONSTRUCTION IN THE EARLY
SOUTH 71 (2003); quoting WILLIAM BYRD, WILLIAM BYRD’S HISTORIES OF THE DIVIDING
LINE BETWIXT VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA 120 (William K. Boyd ed., 1929; reprint,
New York: Dover Publications, 1967).
113
STURM, supra note 58, at 47.
114
Id. at 50; quoting Nancy Shoemaker, How Indians Got to Be Red, 102 AMERICAN
HISTORICAL REVIEW 625, 643 (1997).
115
STURM, supra note 58, at 48; quoting Old Tassel, in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
CLASS 2: INDIAN AFFAIRS 41 (1832).
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Euroamericans. Indeed, the socially-approved practice of intermarriage
between Euroamerican men and Native American women was of
longstanding. For nearly two centuries, Euroamerican officials and
missionaries held up the example of the Virginian John Rolfe, who married
Pocahontas, the daughter of Algonquian chief, Powhatan, in 1614, as proof
of the advantages that could accrue to both Euroamericans (in terms of
peace and economic gain) and Native Americans (in terms of cultural and
religious “betterment”) if they “blended their stocks” in marriage.116 So
beneficial were these unions regarded for British colonial interests that
government officials in 1755 urged a policy of relocating Euroamerican
soldiers and convicts to the frontier to serve as marriage partners for Native
American women.117 Similarly, early United States policy endorsed by
Thomas Jefferson, among others, favored intermarriage between settlers and
Native Americans as a means assimilating the latter to the “civilized”
culture and mores of the former.118 The phenomenon of Euro- and Native
American intermarriage may be attributed in part to the view prevalent
through the 18th century that “red” skin resulted from environmental causes
and did not reflect fundamental differences between the two groups: the
Indians’ application of “bear’s oil, or grease, mixt with a certain red root,
which, by a peculiar property, is able alone, in a few years time, to produce
the Indian colour in those white born.”119 “Europeans,” historian Theda
Perdue states, “refused to admit that Indians possessed genetically darker
skin.”120
The accommodation, indeed cultivation, of Indian-white intermarriage
of this period illustrates Lopez’s point that race is physically constructed by
laws and policies that constrain or facilitate reproductive choices:
While admittedly laws cannot alter biology governing human
morphology, rule-makers can and have altered human behavior

116

PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 72-73. As William Byrd expressed
the point, “A sprightly Lover is the most prevailing Missionary.” Id. at 75. Before marrying
Rolfe, Pocahontas converted to Christianity and changed her name to Rebecca, then
followed her husband to England, where she lived the life of a Jacobean lady until her
death. She is buried in England. Perdue states that “her son and his descendents ethnically
identified as white even as they boasted descent from Pocahontas.” Id. at 73. See a
contemporary portrait of Pocahontas-Rebecca, Jacobean lady, and an account of her life,
http://www.apva.org/history/pocahont.html (last visited August 16, 2006).
117
In 1755, Edmund Aikin, in a report on colonial Indian affairs, urged the
intermarriage of soldiers stationed on the frontier with Indian women “by which means our
Interest among the Indians will be strengthened.” Akins also recommended that “able
bodied men Convicts of petty crimes, instead of being hanged, or incorporated among the
People of our Colonies” be sent to the frontier to marry Indian women and “strengthen the
peace.” PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 73.
118
Id. at 73-74. Thomas Jefferson favored intermarriage of Indian women and white
men to promote civilization, as did his Indian agents for the Creek and the Cherokee,
Benjamin Hawkins and Return Meigs, respectively. See id. at 74-76.
119
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 47.
120
Id. at 46.
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that produces variations in physical appearance. In other words,
laws have directly shaped reproductive choices.121
An example of such law-shaped variations is the phenomenon of
“mixed bloods.” As a result of government-encouraged Indian-white
intermarriage, and later the Cherokee’s own legal codes permitting whiteCherokee unions,122 generations of Cherokee children were racially
constructed as “mixed-bloods.” Purdue writes that, “Unlike their white
neighbors, Native people had no category for ‘mixed-bloods’ and almost
never used the term. On the rare occasion when they did, ‘half-breed’
described or personified departures from traditional ways of doing things
rather than identifying particular individuals by race.”123 For Euroamericans
of the early 19th century, however, mixed-bloods could be unsettling,
liminal beings, confusing at times in their appearance,124 constantly in need
of authoritative surveillance125 and racial coding.126 At the same time,
“mixed-blood” Cherokees who were familiar with Euroamerican culture
could be especially effective in negotiating the interests of the Nation. The
“mixed-blood” Cherokee principal chief John Ross, “[a]lthough only 1/8
Cherokee . . . was reared traditionally and had a preference for native
clothing and mode of dressing as a boy and young man. He was educated in
mission schools and at private boarding schools.”127 Ross was highly
acculturated as a Cherokee, and moved easily between cultures during
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LOPEZ, supra note 107, at 14-15.
“As citizens of a new multiracial nation, Cherokees were willing to accept
intermarriages between themselves and whites but not with African-American slaves.”
STURM, supra note 58, at 54.
123
PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 90. The only group of “mixedbloods,” according to Perdue, which Native people treated distinctively was children born
to “Indian men and white women who had not been adopted into clans.” Id. at 94. Under
the matrilineal rules of many tribes, including the Cherokee, children of Native American
mothers are automatically members of their mother’s clan, regardless of their paternity.
Children of Native American fathers and non-Native mothers, therefore, must be adopted
into clans to receive Native American familial status.
124
In the case of mixed-blood Indian-white children, color was often a poor proxy for
race. Perdue reports that “outsiders” often had difficulty “distinguishing ‘full-bloods’ and
‘mixed-bloods,’” adding, “the eccentricity of genes created a ‘diversity of complexion’ that
made skin tone an . . . imperfect determinant of ancestry.” Id. at 91. On “mixed-blood”
Indians in American literature, see HARRY J. BROWN, INJUN JOE’S GHOST: THE INDIAN
MIXED-BLOOD IN AMERICAN WRITING (2004).
125
Missionaries identified school children according to ancestry, on church rolls
headed “pedigree,” and carefully noted their blood as “full” or “mixed blood.” See
PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 88.
126
See the anecdotes id. at 75 (missionaries in 1822 praise mixed-bloods “instructed in
letters and religion . . . christianized and civilized” while criticizing white children “totally
ignorant of letters and of religion”); 91 (missionaries in 1824 express perplexity that “some
of the full Indians are so light, that, if protected from the weather as much of the people as
our own country, they would not differ many shades from a dark Englishman.”).
127
Cherokee Nation, John Ross, www.cherokee.org (follow “Culture” hyperlink; then
follow “History” hyperlink”; then follow “Chiefs” hyperlink) (last visited August 16,
2006).
122
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successive national crises during his nearly forty-year tenure as principal
chief, from 1828 to his death in 1886.128
In summary, as the 19th century began, Cherokees had adopted two,
complementary race-based strategies for dealing with the new Republic and
the insatiable demands of Euroamerican settlers for tribal lands. On the one
hand, Cherokees appear to have accepted their racial construction as “red,”
but resisted, even inverted, the Euroamerican hierarchy of races that
subordinated red to white. On the other hand, Cherokees increasingly took
on the customs, dress, manners and appearance of Euroamericans, and
through intermarriage with them, “coded” increasingly as white. These
Cherokees, many though not all of them of “mixed-blood,” ascended to
leadership positions in the tribe, and, with “full-bloods,” endeavored to
negotiate their traditional Cherokee self-understanding as “the principal
people”129 by participating in the vernacular of Euroamerican culture and
the institutions of the Southern colonies, later states.130 Consequently, the
road to Cherokee prosperity for some would lead through the political
institution of the nation-state, and the economic engine of plantation
slavery.
2.

The Construction of “Black” by “Red”

Lopez reminds us that the specification of faces and forbearers in terms
of race relies upon social meaning-systems which, “while originally only
ideas, gain force as they are reproduced in the material conditions of
society.”131 Cherokees, who adopted and strategically adapted
128

Id. Known in Cherokee as Koo-wi-s-gu-wi, Ross is widely considered the greatest
of the Cherokee chiefs for his leadership of the Nation during the trauma of Removal and
the Civil War. Ross’s ancestry was seven-eighths Scottish and one-eighth Cherokee.
WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, AFTER THE TRAIL OF TEARS: THE CHEROKEES’ STRUGGLE FOR
SOVERIGNTY, 1839-1880 3 (1993). Nonetheless, Ross was widely respected among
culturally conservative Cherokees for his resistance to Removal: “though only an eighthblood, [he] was inwardly all Cherokee.” GRACE STEELE WOODWARD, THE CHEROKEES
132 (1963).
129
“The proper name by which the Cherokees call themselves [is Ani-Yun-Wiya],
signifying ‘real people’ or ‘principal people.’. . .The word properly denotes ‘Indians,’ as
distinguished from people of other races, but in usage it is restricted to mean members of
the Cherokee tribe.” JAMES MOONEY, HISTORY, MYTHS, AND SACRED FORMULAS OF THE
CHEROKEES 15 (1900; 1992).
130
Historians McLoughlin and Conser caution, however, that “[o]ne must avoid the
easy conclusion that the wealthy, mixed-blood elite was necessarily the ruling body or
oligarchy of the Cherokee Nation at this time [ca. 1835].” William G. McLoughlin &
Walter H. Conser, Jr., The Cherokees in Transition: A Statistical Analysis of the Federal
Cherokee Census of 1835, 64 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 678-703, 698 (1977).
As checks on any potential oligarchy, the Cherokee government functioned through a
bicameral legislature, where “by tradition and design, the Cherokees consistently gave the
well-to-do a larger role in the upperhouse while retaining popular control of the
lowerhouse,” and, in addition, the Cherokee followed their tradition “that all decisions
affecting the general welfare of the tribe or nation should be taken only after long debate
had produced a consensus.” Id.
131
LOPEZ, supra note 107, at 14.
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Euroamerican notions of race and “redness” in the 17th and 18th centuries,
appear to have easily embraced Euroamerican bias against black skin when
they encountered it in the bodies of African slaves, and to have interpreted
it immediately as a sign of intrinsically inferior social status.132 While
Cherokees initially had no concept of race,133 “[s]oon after their first contact
with Africans . . . the Cherokees no doubt realized that Europeans regarded
blacks as inferiors and they were in danger of receiving the same
treatment.”134 Indeed, “[t]he English colonists purchased their first cargo of
Africans at about the same time they began enslaving Indians.”135
The enslavement of Native Americans peaked during 1715-1717 and
declined until it officially ended after the American Revolution.136 While
the Indian slave-trade flourished, the powerful Cherokees, while sometimes
victims of capture and sale, turned away from their aboriginal system of
warfare (which operated in the service of clan-based retributive justice)137
and became adept market participants in the capture and trading of Indians
of neighboring tribes, such as the Yuchi and Guale, to Europeans. As a
result, traditional Cherokee society, which operated economically on
subsistence farming and hunting, changed forever, as Cherokees became
increasingly dependent on the Western market goods they received in
exchange for captive Indians.138
As the market for Indian slaves declined, Cherokees shifted to
capturing and trading black slaves, having “discovered that the capture of
black slaves was particularly profitable, and by the American Revolution
most Cherokees traded almost exclusively in black slaves.”139 When
African slaves ran away, their owners commonly employed Native
Americans, including Cherokees, to retrieve their lost property.140 Fearing
alliances between Native Americans and African slaves, the colonists “not
only employed Indians to find escaped slaves but also used blacks in
132

See William G. McLoughlin, Red Indians, Black Slavery and White Racism:
America’s Slaveholding Indians, 26 AMERICAN QUARTERLY 367, 371 (1974) (“The first
time that Indians ever saw black men they appeared as the slaves of Spanish, French or
English masters. Consequently, without any policy of divide and rule, the white man
showed the Indian by his actions that he considered darker people inferior to white-skinned
people.”).
133
On the tribal and ontological status of the atsi nahsa’i, or bondsmen, owned by
aboriginal Cherokees, and why they should not categorized as “slaves” in the modern
sense, see PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 3-18.
134
Id. at 36.
135
Id. at 36-37.
136
Id. at 37.
137
See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO
COURT 10-39 (1975) (elaborating traditional Cherokee justice norms based on clan
revenge); and id., Wolf Warriors and Turtle Kings: Native American Law Before the Blue
Coats, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1043 (1997) (arguing traditional Cherokees were highly legalistic
and lived under a value-based jurisprudence according to sacred norms).
138
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 22.
139
Id. at 38.
140
Id. at 39-40 (“In 1763 whites agreed to pay Indians one musket and three blankets,
the equivalent of thirty-five deerskins, for each black slave captured and returned.”).
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military campaigns against Indians.”141 As historian William McLoughlin
explains, “white colonial governors, settlers, and Army commanders in the
Carolinas in the 18th century deliberately spread scare stories of Indian
cruelty among their slaves, armed slaves to kill Indians and paid Indians to
capture and return runaway slaves. . . . [all as] a conscious and calculated
part of white policy in the years when the Indians and blacks in the
Southeast outnumbered the white settlers and could, together, have wiped
out the whites.”142 Throughout the 18th century, “[c]onvinced that the
European and native Americans were practically identical, whites
simultaneously insisted that Africans were the exact opposite of Europeans
and Indians. By emphasizing the actual, exaggerated, and imagined
differences between Africans and Indians, whites successfully masked the
cultural similarities of the two as well as their mutual exploitation by
whites.”143
Their culture now deeply committed to the economic system of the
colonists, Cherokees readily ascribed inferior status to black skin, which
they associated exclusively with objects of the hunt, capture, and trade with
whites; or as agents of warfare waged against them by white masters. Their
early participation in the Indian slave-trade had taught Cherokees to
transform certain persons into commodities. Now, at the end of the 18th
century, whether as goods in the marketplace or tools of the fight, black
bodies were first and foremost instruments of labor under the exclusive
control of another—the very definition of slaves. In contrast to slaveobjects, Cherokees were subjects who enjoyed intersubjective relations with
whites, intermarrying with them, studying their language and culture, and
benefiting from ideologies of philosophy, religion, and law that, for a while
yet, classified “white men” and “red men” as brothers, if not equals, “under
the skin.” The monogenetic premise of a common humanity, however,
would soon change, and “blood would tell.”
3.

Cherokee Slavery and Cherokee Nation

Two major shifts, one socio-economic, the other political, occurred in
the Cherokee Nation of the 19th century that bear particularly on today’s
Freedmen controversy. The first was the adoption of plantation slavery and
the second was the adoption of the progressive political form of the nation.
The two are historically related in that many of the same individuals who
formed the economic, largely mixed-blood elite who owned significant
landed estates were the most ardent supporters of nationhood and the
specification of Cherokee political identity in terms of citizenship.
Cherokees of the antebellum South contributed to the empowerment of a
race-based economy by simultaneously exercising authority over racesubordinates and negotiating their own identities under the conditions of
white colonization.
141

Id. at 41.
McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 369-70.
143
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 47.
142
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Race as Economics

The Cherokees in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
occupied aboriginal lands located largely in northwestern Georgia and
southeastern Tennessee.144 At an estimated 12,000-15,000 population, they
were one of the largest tribes in the Southeastern United States.145 They
were also the wealthiest tribe, having sold extensive tracts of their land after
1777.146 The availability of capital, combined with a government policy
favoring Indian “civilization” through yeoman husbandry,147 and their own
ardent desire to acquire Western technical knowledge and equipment,148
moved the Cherokees rapidly from an economy based on subsistence
farming and hunting and to one based on the production of surplus
agricultural products for market.149 In the process, many Cherokees
abandoned traditional gender roles which assigned agricultural cultivation
and hunting to women’s and men’s labor, respectively. With game scarce
and warfare ended, Cherokee men turned to agriculture, and in so doing,
alienated Cherokee women from the “real economic power” they had
previously enjoyed.150 Once labor was re-gendered, and only then, Perdue
argues, the door opened for Cherokee slave labor and the plantation system:
“Only when the identification of women with agriculture had ended was the
introduction and utilization of slave labor for cultivation by even a minority
of Cherokees possible.”151

144

McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 380.
Id.
146
Id. (“Though [the Cherokee] lost much of their original land after 1777 in various
treaties, they generally struck shrewd bargains for it.”) On annuities to the Cherokee
generated by sales of tribal land and rights-of-way from 1777 to 1804, see WILLIAM G.
MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 19, 24, 46, 77, & 91 (1986)
(proceeds included trade goods, cash, and annuities from federal government promised in
perpetuity).
147
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 53-54 (citing George Washington’s proposal
to the Cherokees for transition to an agricultural economy, as a means of their
“civilization”).
148
Id. at 54 (citing report of Indian agent that “the Cherokees avidly sought the tools of
civilization”).
149
See McLoughlin & Conser, supra note 130, at 680 (“[By 1835] Cherokees were
indeed far advanced in the acquisition of wealth and skills and . . . those with a high
proportion of mixed Cherokee-white ancestry tended to have more skills and more wealth.
It also appears that there was a definite trend toward an agrarian-capitalist social order, that
economic classes were beginning to appear, and that communal life, the clan system, and
the extended family were fading.”).
150
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 52. Traditional Cherokee gender roles which
associate agriculture with women and hunting with men are based in tribal stories of
origination: Selu, the first woman, was physically the source of corn, which she produced
from her body, and Kana’ti, the first man, was the provider of game, which he stored in the
ground and withdrew as needed. See MOONEY, supra note 129, at 242-48.
151
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 53.
145
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Statistics from the period show that as the Cherokee population grew in the
first 60 years of the nineteenth century the number of slaves of Cherokees,
and slaves of Cherokees as a percentage of the Cherokee population, grew
as well. McLaughlin reports the following data:152
Year
1809
1825
1835
1860

Cherokee
Population
(rounded)
12,000
14,000
15,000
17,000

Slaves of
Cherokees
(number)
583
1,277
1,592
4,000

Slaves of Cherokees
(as percent of
Cherokee population)
4.85%
9.12%
10.61%
23.52%

According to the census of 1835, “slaveholders cultivated more acres
and produced more corn than nonslaveholding Cherokees, and they owned
most of the nascent industries in the Nation.”153 With profits from the sale
of excess agricultural product, Cherokees invested in various enterprises,
such as mills and ferries.154 The number of slaves owned per plantation,
however, was not large: of the 207 slaveholders in 1835, “168, or 83
percent, owned fewer than 10 slaves.”155 Nonetheless, in 1835, Cherokees
were significant slave-holders compared to the other tribes of the
southeastern United States, and after Removal, the Cherokee held more
slaves than any other tribe in Indian Territory.156
Significantly, ownership of black slaves was not evenly distributed
across the Cherokee population according to race. “Mixed-bloods” owned a
disproportionately high share of the slaves. Perdue reports that “[o]nly 17
percent of the people living in the Cherokee Nation in 1835 had any white
ancestors, but 78 percent of the members of families owning slaves had
some proportion of white blood.”157 Missionaries of the time referred to
“the half-breeds [who] have large plantations, which they cultivate by the
aid of slaves.”158 It would misleading, however, to suggest that Cherokee
plantation slavery at this time was exclusively the provenance of wealthy
152

McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 380. Calculation of slaves as percent
of Cherokee population my own. Other sources place the number of Cherokee slaves in
1860 lower than McLaughlin. See R. HALLIBURTON, JR., RED OVER BLACK: BLACK
SLAVERY AMONG THE CHEROKEE INDIANS 117 (1977) (slaves of Cherokees in 1860 equal
2504); and LITTLEFIELD, supra note 6, at 9 (slaves of Cherokees in 1860 equal 2511). Even
assuming the lowest figure (2504), slaves as a percent of the Cherokee population rose
significantly post-Removal. I do not mean to imply that slaves were counted as part of the
Cherokee population; they were not. However, like illegal aliens in the United States today,
their numbers were increasing significantly as a function of the majority (Cherokee)
population and posing correspondingly greater challenges of cultural integration and social
“management.”
153
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 60.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 58.
156
LITTLEFIELD, supra note 6, at 8.
157
Id.
158
PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 96.
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“white-Cherokees” where some “full-bloods” (albeit a minority)159 also
participated in the system.160
The emergence of “mixed-blood” Cherokees in Euroamerican society
in the early part of the 19th century is nonetheless remarkable. In addition to
success in the economic sphere, many “mixed-bloods” negotiated hybridic
Cherokee identities161 through intermarriage with whites,162 conversion to
Christianity, adoption of Western-style manners and dress, and the
achievement of fluency in written and spoken English.163 As Perdue notes,
“Contact with a white parent or grandparent gave these people a head start
toward ‘civilization,’ and it influenced them to identify linguistically with
white society.”164 Economic prosperity through the plantation economy and
successful negotiation of Cherokee identities under the conditions of
Euroamerican cultural colonialism, especially by “mixed-bloods,” gave the
Cherokees their reputation at the time as “the ‘most civilized’ of all the
Indian nations.”165 As McLoughlin and Conser observe, “The Cherokees,
in short, were acquiring by 1835, only a generation after giving up warfare
against advancing white expansion, a bourgeois socioeconomic
structure.”166
159

“Slavery did not permeate the Cherokee tribe but was concentrated in the hands of a
few: only 7.4 percent of tribal members held slaves. Slaveholders were concentrated in the
more mixed-blood Cherokee communities and among the more mixed-blood families: only
1 percent of all full-blood families owned slaves . . . . This, of course, was because more
mixed-blood families were wealthier and engaged in plantation agriculture.” THORNTON,
supra note 42, at 53 (analyzing data from the 1835 census).
160
STURM, supra note 58, at 56 (“Although we can discern some correlation between
white racial ancestry, a higher class standing, and slave ownership, there were also
significant exceptions.”).
161
The term “hybridities” appears in postcolonial theory and refers to those moments
“when the scenario written by colonialism is given a performance by the native that
estranges and undermines the colonialist script.” Benita Perry, Problems in Current
Theories of Colonial Discourse, in THE POST-COLONIAL STUDIES READER 36, 42 (Bill
Ashcroft et al., eds. 1995). For examples and discussion of Cherokee hybridities in the
nineteenth century, see S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the Challenge of
Kennewick Man, 79 TEMPLE. L. REV. 89, 117-18 (2006).
162
Perdue reports that “[w]hen the United States government embarked on its policy of
‘civilization’ . . . many Cherokees came to view matrilineal kinship as an aspect of their
‘savage’ existence which had to be abandoned. Consequently Cherokees began practicing
the European pattern of inheritance, and in 1808 the council pledged ‘to give protection to
children as heirs to their father’s property and to the widow’s share.” PERDUE, SLAVERY,
supra note 68, at 51.
163
PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 87.
164
PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 60. The 1835 census shows English literacy
positively correlated with slaveholding: Among people living in slaveholding families . . .
39 percent could read English, while only 13 percent were proficient at reading Cherokee.
In the case of nonslaveholding Cherokees, less than 4 percent were capable of reading
English, and 18 percent could read Cherokee.” Id.
165
McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 379. Sturm notes that the plantation
economy created a class-division within the Cherokees between slaveholding “full-bloods”
and non-slaveholding “mixed-bloods” but cautions it would be simplistic to reduce racial
orientation to a proxy for “cultural orientation and social values (i.e., that mixed blood
equals progressive or that full blood equals traditional).” STURM, supra note 58, at 55-57.
166
McLoughlin & Conser, supra note 130, at 697.

20-Aug-06]

CHEROKEE FREEDMEN

37

However, the establishment of Cherokee identities under the conditions
of plantation slavery required Cherokee masters to reproduce and even
intensify racial stigma. Though some scholars have concluded that
Cherokees “probably treated their slaves much better on the average than
did their white counterparts,”167 perhaps harkening back to a time before
Cherokees learned to code skin-color as a sign of inferiority,168 others have
argued that “slavery among the Cherokees was little different from that in
the white South,”169 and “some Cherokee masters could be as cruel and
vicious as their white counterparts.”170
The success of plantation slavery among an elite of the Cherokees in
the first three decades of the nineteenth century, therefore, required a
constellation of factors, among which are: government policies favoring
“civilization” through yeoman husbandry; an influx of capital from the sale
of certain tribal lands; an adequate and reliable supply of productive forces
(land, tools, agricultural knowledge, and African labor); the subordination
of clan-based obligations to the rule of American law; the transformation of
an economy based on hunting and subsistence farming, to one devoted to
the production of surplus goods for sale; the transformation of gendered
labor roles within Cherokee society; and intermarriage with whites and the
creation of corresponding bonds of intimacy and obligation with the
dominant society.
The productive organization and deployment of these social and
economic opportunities, however, required Cherokee elites to implement
Euroamerican racial hegemonies and a corresponding ideology of “blood”
purity.171 The Cherokee system of plantation slavery was premised on the
167

PERDUE, SLAVERY, supra note 68, at 98. See also McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra
note 132, at 381 (“It is generally argued that the Cherokees treated their slaves very
leniently.”). McLaughlin takes issue with this claim and asserts treatment of slaves by
“red” and “white” masters was equally variable. Id.
168
“Race as we understand it now was not the determining factor in a person’s tribal
identity or tribal membership. Instead, lineage determined belonging. A person who
appeared ‘Black’ and had a Native American mother would have been defined and
accepted as Indian.” Miles, supra note 111, at 145 (referring to early colonial-era
matrilineal kinship systems of Southeastern tribes including the Cherokee).
169
LITTLEFIELD, supra note 6, at 8.
170
Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign Immunity and Toward
Reparation and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 WASH. & LEE R.E.A.L. J. 61, 81
(2005). See also Terrion L. Williamson, The Plight of “Nappy-Headed” Indians: The Role
of Tribal Sovereignty in the Systematic Discrimination against Black Freedmen by the
Federal Government and Native American Tribes, 10 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 233, 240
(2004) (“One explanation for the differential treatment of Cherokee Freedmen is the
Cherokee Nation’s adoption of slavery in its most vicious form.”).
171
As used in this Article, “hegemonies” refers to the “scripts” of a dominant culture
which are uncritically accepted and enacted by that culture and by the people whom they
oppress. Racial hegemonies, for example, might express themselves in the unreflective
sorting of people into colors, and ranking those colors in terms of status, or assigning
“naturally” good or bad attributes to persons in those categories. Ideologies are based in
hegemonies and have the form of rationalizations, explanations, or justifications of the
status quo. Race science and Social Darwinism in the nineteenth century would be
examples of ideologies based in the mutually reinforcing hegemonies of white, male,
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Cherokee construction of persons of African descent as ontologically
“other” and inferior to both Indians and whites, and therefore, like horses
and oxen, as appropriate entities for service in the fields and marketplaces
of their masters.172 Cherokees had been primed to embrace slavery by their
participation in the Indian slave market of the eighteenth century, and now,
in the nineteenth century, the social place already created for black men and
women to occupy became an economic space for exploitation by largely
“mixed-blood,” white-acculturated Cherokees.173
This picture of Cherokee social and economic arrangements in the early
nineteenth century, however, has the quality of a negative: it demonstrates
how a subset of white-acculturated, often “mixed-blood” Cherokees, a tribal
elite of critical historical importance, deployed Euroamerican racial
ideologies to enslave African Americans for profit. Yet this picture is
partial. It does not reveal in what sense these Native Americans retained
and fought-for their identities as Cherokees. To understand this side of the
picture, it is necessary to examine the rationale for the Cherokee Nation.
b.

Race as Nation

In the early 1800s, the destabilization of the traditional Cherokee clan
system led to the consolidation of the tribe around the image of the nationstate.174 As historian Fay Yarbrough observes, “In the nineteenth century,
the strength of the clan system waned, and the concept of legal citizenship
substituted for clan in determining legitimate membership in the Cherokee
Nation.”175 Under the clan system, tribal membership was conferred by
birth to a Cherokee woman; a matrilineal society, the Cherokee were
indifferent to the race of the father where membership status was

Euroamerican supremacy. On hegemony and its relation to ideology, see STURM, supra
note 58, at 19-26 and sources cited therein.
172
On the status of slaves as both property and (legally responsible) persons, see, e.g.
MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATION OF
HUMANITY AND INTEREST 158-69 (1981); and Arthur F. Howington, “Not in the Condition
of a Horse or an Ox”: Ford v. Ford, the Law of Testamentary Manumission and the
Tennessee Courts’ Recognition of Slave Humanity, 34 TENNESSEE HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY 249-63 (1975).
173
It is important to observe that significant opposition to Cherokee acculturation to
white society and its institutions existed within the tribe. Usually associated with “fullbloods,” the antipathy to accommodation received spiritual and political form in the
creation of the Keetoowah Society. The Society united Cherokee religious selfunderstanding and nationalism, and has been characterized as “abolitionist” by some, and
by others, as “not being pro-slavery, rather than being anti-slavery.” PATRICK N. MINGES,
SLAVERY IN THE CHEROKEE NATION: THE KEETOOWAH SOCIETY AND THE DEFINING OF A
PEOPLE 1855-1867 83 (2003).
174
STURM, supra note 58, at 43 (“[The] appropriation and internalization of
Euroamerican notions of racial identity, in addition to concurrent changes in political
organization, helped set the stage for the emergence of Cherokee nationalism in the early
nineteenth century.”).
175
Fay Yarbrough, Legislating Women’s Sexuality: Cherokee Marriage Laws in the
Nineteenth Century, 38 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY 385-406, 387 (2004).
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concerned.176 The marginalization of the clan system by Cherokee
engagement with Euroamerican social, cultural and economic systems
opened the way for new definitions of Cherokee tribal membership; by
adopting a Euroamerican model of government as the tribe’s organizing
principle, membership in a Cherokee clan was put in tension with, and, for
many, eventually replaced by, Cherokee citizenship.177
The model of the nation served the Cherokees by providing a dual
vantage point from which they could alternately project outward, to the
federal government and to the states of the Union, a self-conception as a
government, one among many, possessing the rights and dignity appropriate
to a sovereign.178 The model of the nation also provided the vantage from
which the tribe could look inward and assign to itself an identity as a people
according to its own lights. The political identity of the Cherokee Nation
would reflect both: a sovereign among nations and a people set apart.
From the start the national design intentionally imitated key features of
the United States federal government and the ideology of rights:
In the first three decades of the nineteenth century, [Cherokee]
leaders established a bicameral legislature, a national police
force, a supreme court, a elective system of representation based
on geographic districts rather than towns, and in 1828, a written
constitution patterned after that of the U.S. federal government.
They also adopted a concept of tribal sovereignty that ‘shared
much of the ideology of the individual sovereign states of the
Union.’ . . . [T]he new Cherokee state gradually displaced town
politics, becoming the official administrative, bureaucratic, and
political center of the Cherokees’ newly emerging national
community.179

176

See id. at 386-87 (“The offspring of unions between Cherokees became members of
their mother’s clan. . . . Matrilineal kinship meant that Cherokee women who married nonCherokee men knew their children would have an undeniable claim to membership in the
Nation. Unions between Cherokee men and non-Cherokee women, however, produced
children with no clan affiliation, and therefore no rights in the Cherokee Nation. For much
of Cherokee history, being born Cherokee meant being born of a Cherokee woman.”)
177
The supplanting of the clan system by the model of national citizenship varies
among the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokees, and the United Keetoowah Band.
I also would emphasize that many Cherokees, then and now, retain clan affiliations which
are strong sources of personal and group identity.
178
The Cherokees’ negotiation of its sovereign identity vis-à-vis the United States and
the State of Georgia resulted in the famous Cherokee Cases of the Marshall Court. See
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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STURM, supra note 58, at 52-53; quoting MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE,
supra note 146, at xvii. See also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 189 (1984) (Cherokees in 1827
Constitution “asserted that they were one of the sovereign and independent nations of the
earth with complete jurisdiction over their own territory”).
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Race, however, became “a cornerstone of the national identity,” and the
Cherokee’s adoption of the ideology of “race as nation” implied “that race,
or racial metaphors of blood or kinship, could be used to define a nation ‘as
a collective subject, as a superorganism with a unique biological-cultural
essence.’”180 The “new Cherokee state would increasingly replicate the
racial ideologies and practices of the U.S. federal and state governments.”181
As one of its first steps, the new government, in its Constitution of 1827,
denied persons of “the African race” the right to hold office and the right to
vote:
Art. III, Sec. 4. No person shall be eligible to a seat in the
General Council, but a free Cherokee male citizen, who shall
have attained to the age of twenty-five years. The descendants of
Cherokee men by all free women, except the African race,
whose parents may have been living together as man and wife,
according to the customs and laws of this Nation, shall be
entitled to all the rights and privileges of this nation, as well as
the posterity of Cherokee women by all free men. No person
who is of negro or mulatto parentage, either by the father or
mother side, shall be eligible to hold any office of profit, honor
or trust under this Government.182
Art. III, Sec. 7. All free male citizens, (excepting negroes and
descendents of white and Indian men by negro women who may
have been set free,) who shall have attained to the age of
eighteen years, shall be equally entitled to vote in all public
elections.183
The exclusion of persons of African descent from Cherokee Nation officeholding was continued in the successor to the 1827 Constitution, the postRemoval 1839 Constitution.184 The 1839 Constitution also carried forward
the denial of the voting franchise to slaves and women.185
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Even before adoption of the 1827 Constitution, the Cherokee Council
in the early 1820s passed a series of antimiscegenation laws like the one
enacted in 1824, which prohibited “[i]ntermarriages between negro slaves,
and Indians, or whites,” stating such marriages “shall not be lawful,” and
providing that anyone permitting “their negro slaves, to intermarry with
Indians or whites” would be liable to “the Cherokee Nation” for a fine; and
further:
[A]ny male Indian or white man marrying a negro woman slave,
he or they shall be punished with fifty-nine stripes on the bare
back, and any Indian or white woman, marrying a negro man
slave, shall be punished with twenty-five stripes.186
Such statutes had the effect of intensifying the distinction between
Cherokees, here referred to racially as “Indians,” in contrast to “negro
slaves” and “whites.” In this way, Cherokee statutory law assigned roles of
normative intimacy according to a race-based system of meanings. Further,
while the code produced “Indians,” “white men,” and “white women” in
terms of race and gender, for blacks only the code produced “docile
bodies,” to use Foucault’s famous phrase, along three axes—race, gender,
and servitude: “negro woman slave” and “negro man slave.”187 Finally,
while the code constructs the objects of its control and stipulates their
normative relationships, it simultaneously establishes “the Cherokee
Nation” as an offended sovereign, whose authority opposes lawbreakers per
se, regardless of race or gender, and whose “stripes” produce, in Foucault’s
terms, “the effect, in the rites of punishment, of a certain mechanism of
power: of a power that not only did not hesitate to exert itself directly on
bodies, but was exalted and strengthened by its visible manifestations.”188
The elimination of licit marriages between “negro slaves” on the one
hand, and “Indians” or “whites” on the other, focuses on slave-status: the
1827 Constitution “permitted citizenship, albeit with restrictions, for
186

STURM, supra note 58, at 54. The case of Shoe Boots, a Cherokee male who
successfully petitioned the Council in 1824 to grant citizenship and freedom to his three
children by Doll, his slave, is often cited as an exception to the social prohibition of
intimate partnerships between Cherokees and persons of African descent. In granting his
petition, the Council admonished him to father no more children with Doll. The story of
Shoeboots and Doll as a study of race and power in the Cherokee Nation is examined in the
excellent book by TIYA MILES, TIES THAT BIND: THE STORY OF AN AFRO-CHEROKEE
FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM (2005).
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On “docile bodies” as the objects of disciplinary systems peculiar to the modern
age, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 135-69,
136 (1977) (“A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved.”).
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Id. at 57. Other laws passed by the Cherokee Council prior to Removal reflect
similar attempts to objective African descendents by denying them the liberties enjoyed by
Euroamericans: “no contract or bargain entered into with any slave or slaves without the
approbation of their masters shall be binding” (1819); “no one may purchase any item of
property from a slave without permission from his owner” (1820); “no slave shall be
allowed to sell or buy spirituous liquor” (1820). McLaughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132,
at 381.
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descendents of Cherokee women and free black men.”189 If the 1827
Constitution can be said to look backwards, to the older clan system, in this
recognition of citizenship, the action of the Council in 1825, to grant
citizenship to the children of Cherokee men married to white women,
looked forward, to the nation-model of citizenship: “The Cherokee Council
extended citizenship to ‘the children of Cherokee men and white women
living in the Cherokee Nation as man and wife’ and made them ‘entitled to
all the immunities and privileges enjoyed by citizens descending from the
Cherokee race, by the mother’s side.’”190 As Yarbrough summarizes,
“Cherokee men could now create Cherokee citizens.”191
Following the Removal Act of 1830, the pressure of the federal
government and the State of Georgia, its militia, and lawless white settlers
to obtain Cherokee land became overwhelming, and in 1835, an
unauthorized group of Cherokees, a minority of citizens known as the
Treaty Party, and the United States entered into the Treaty of New Echota
for the sale of all remaining Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi. The
Treaty Party, an elite group of some of the wealthiest plantation owners,
and their slaves immediately decamped for Indian Territory.192 Though both
the leadership of the Treaty Party and the majority political body, the
National Party, owned slaves, the remaining Cherokees, who were more
culturally conservative, now “associated slavery with the white southerners
who had forced them from their homes and with the slaveholding
Cherokees who had signed the fraudulent treaty.”193 Attempts by Principal
Chief Ross to retain their land base failed, and in the winter of 1838-39, at
the bayonet-point of thousands of federal troops, approximately 16,000
Cherokee citizens and their slaves embarked for Indian Territory (present
day northeastern Oklahoma) on what became known to Cherokees as
Nunna daul Isunyi, “the trail where we cried.” An estimated one-quarter of
the tribe and an unknown number of slaves perished on route.
The trauma of their forced march, displacement from ancestral lands,
anger at their betrayal by fellow Cherokees, and ardent desire to survive as a
nation led almost immediately to two defining political events: the
confrontation and killing of most of the leaders of the Treaty Party and the
189

Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 389.
Id. at 388.
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Id. at 389.
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On their arrival, the members of the Treaty Party negotiated their status with a
group of some 1,130 Cherokees or their descendents known as “the Old Settlers,” who had
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Arkansas; by 1835 when the Treaty Party arrived, the Old Settlers had been pushed into
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signing of the 1839 Constitution. In these large gestures of sovereignty, the
Cherokee Nation symbolically witnessed the end of one phase of its
political life and announced the start of another.194 When, in a ceremony in
1846, Principal Chief Ross finally accepted the Treaty of New Echota as a
fait accomplice, he shook hands with his arch enemy, Stand Watie, the sole
surviving leader of the Treaty Party, and deftly acknowledged the biological
and nationalistic fundaments of their bond, saying, “We are all of the
household of the Cherokee family and of one blood . . . embracing each
other as Countrymen, friends, and relatives.”195
In the years preceding the Civil War, the Cherokee Nation enacted
increasingly severe slave codes. These codes re-entrenched the position of
the “mixed-blood” elite who once again owned the majority of slaves,
operated plantations (albeit on a smaller scale), and sought to control the
Nation’s blood-based political and social identities. Slave rebellions in
1841, 1842, and 1850196 prompted enactment of even harsher penalties on
disobedient slaves and those would assist them in emulating the lifestyle of
the Nation’s citizens. From 1841 to 1859, the following laws were passed
by the Council (as summarized by McLaughlin):
1841
1842
1848
1855
1859

No slave shall be allowed to carry firearms, knives, dirks,
or other dangerous weapons
Any free negro or slave aiding another slave to run away
shall receive 100 lashes and be removed from the
Cherokee Nation
Anyone teaching a negro to read or write shall be
banished from the Cherokee Nation
No public school teacher suspected of “entertaining
sentiments favorable to abolitionism” shall be allowed in
the Nation
All free blacks in the Nation shall be required to leave
(this bill though passed by both houses of the Cherokee
legislature was vetoed by the chief).197

As McLoughlin observes, “it can be shown very easily that the status of
black slaves and black freedmen among the Cherokees declined steadily
194

While Chief Ross and the Cherokee government were not implicated in the
assassinations of the Nation’s political enemies, the killings “by a group of Cherokees”
were performed “in accordance with the law of 1829 which had made the cession of
Cherokee land a capital offense.” Id. at 73 (describing the deceased as “executed”). Treaty
Party leader John Ridge had stated, immediately after signing the traitorous Treaty of New
Echota, “I feel as if I had just signed my own death warrant.” CONLEY, supra note 50, at
143. No one was ever charged in connection with the deaths. The legal predicate of the
killings in Cherokee law, known to all, and the attendant political circumstances, make the
deaths symbolic of an act of sovereignty, even if the killings were performed by individuals
not acting under color of Cherokee law.
195
STURM, supra note 58, at 66.
196
McLoughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 381.
197
Id.

44

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

[20-Aug-06

over the years. Accepting the standards of neighboring white civilization,
the Cherokees gradually adopted all the worst features of Southern black
slave codes (including the mounted, armed patrols to enforce them).”198
Yarbrough states, “Throughout the nineteenth century, Cherokee authorities
sharpened the line between Indians and people of African descent. The
Nation also more closely aligned itself with the white race and adopted a
racial ideology that focused on the difference between black and non-black
instead of white and non-white”:
That is, whereas American society defined its members in terms
that distinguished between those who were white and everyone
else, the Cherokees chose to focus on the similarities among all
non-black peoples, making the distinction between those who
were black and everyone else. This new racial identification was
a great ideological shift for Cherokees who had seen themselves
as not only distinct from whites, but distinct from other Indian
tribes as well.199
Expanding but also fundamentally revising the antimiscegenation law
of 1824, the first law that the Council passed after Removal, on September
19, 1839, was entitled, “An Act to Prevent Amalgamation with Colored
Persons.” The Act elaborated more repressive restrictions on intermarriage
which included the prohibition of intermarriage “between a free male or
female citizen with any slave or person of color.”200 Significantly, where
the 1824 law penalized white or Indian intermarriage with slaves, the postRemoval law, while retaining this prohibition, conceived the crime as one
of Cherokee citizens’ “amalgamation with colored persons.” Thus, the first
act of the new Cherokee government was to impose as a civic obligation the
avoidance of inter-racial marriage when the citizen’s partner was other than
white or Cherokee. By statutory implication, to be a “pure blood” Cherokee
was not to be a “person of color” and to be a good Cherokee citizen was to
marry within racial boundaries (that is to say, to marry a white or another
Cherokee). Further, to underscore the gravity of this racial-civic injunction,
the penalty for violating the new statute was “fifty stripes for convicted
females of both races and a hundred lashes for black males whereas the
[pre-Removal laws] had punished black and Cherokee males equally but
more severely than females.”201
Yarbrough argues that the anti-amalgamation law “may have reflected
a larger legal effort to protect the racial purity of the Cherokee Nation” by
deterring men of African descent from forming intimate unions with
Cherokee women, or by creating an incentive for Cherokee women to seek
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out Cherokee men.202 Sturm echoes this theme in the context of citizenship
criteria, when she observes that “[b]y excluding African Americans from
the body politic, the Cherokee state was reproducing nineteenth-century
Euroamerican racial ideologies in its own legislation, including the idea that
national identity was linked to racial identity and the notion that ‘racemixing’ with African Americans was polluting.”203 In 1840 the Cherokees
went even further, to make it unlawful for “any free negro or mulatto, not of
Cherokee blood, to hold or own any improvements within the limits of this
Nation.”204 As Sturm explains, “The wording of this legislation is
significant because it marks the first time when Cherokees officially began
to conflate ideas of race and blood in their own political discourse and
practices.”205 Finally, historian Karen Woods writes that “[t]he regulation
of ‘tribal blood’ through miscegenation laws was part of a policy to keep
Cherokee property in the hands of Cherokee citizens and to protect
sovereignty through the preservation of ‘Indian-ness.’”206
In summary, the rise of the Cherokee Nation effected a displacement of
the traditional clan system, and with it, the exclusive right of Cherokee
women to define, by their bodies, who would become members of the tribe.
As my review of Cherokee law has shown, however, the construction of
Cherokee identity along lines of race did not abandon biology when it
assumed the form of nation. Rather, Cherokee law, as represented in its
Constitution of 1827, Constitution of 1839, slave codes, and other acts of
the legislature established Cherokee citizenship criteria as the elaboration of
possibilities inherent in biological lineage, opening up the strictly
matrilineal system to allow Cherokee men to generate new citizens through
exogamy. The commitment of the Nation’s mixed-blood elite to the
economic system of plantation slavery, however, presented dangerous
opportunities for class-transgressions with slaves and miscegenation with
blacks, free or slave. In response, the Nation devoted considerable energy
and attention to constructing and policing racial boundaries for the good of
the Nation and, by 1840, for the purity of “Cherokee blood.” Indeed, by
then, they were one and the same.207
202

Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 393. Cherokee legislation in the 1840s and 1850s
also made it increasingly difficult for white men to marry Cherokee women. The legal
obstacles, involving a license application, a petition to the Council, testimonials of
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The Limits of Biological Definitions of Citizenship

The utility of “Cherokee blood” as a marker for citizenship is limited
by the inaccuracy of the Dawes Rolls and by the Rolls’ reliance on
nineteenth-century race science. The Rolls’ inaccuracy is especially evident
in three areas.
First, though purporting to separately identify Cherokees by blood and
Freedmen, many on the Freedmen’s roll descended from persons with
“Indian blood.” Despite the best efforts of the Nation’s laws to prevent
miscegenation, persons of African and Cherokee descents did marry and
have children: the 1835 census reveals a small percentage of self-identified
“Mixed ‘Negro”” Cherokees in North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and
Tennessee.208 Following Removal, missionaries “reported that intermarriage
continued and [antimiscegenation] laws were not enforced.”209 Historian
Tiya Miles summarizes the matter, stating, “Interracial marriage in the slave
quarters and in free communities of color meant that the Black population
and the Indian population were overlapping and expanding and that the
slave population included more and more persons of Black and Native
descent.”210 This does not even take into account the descendents of persons
born outside of marriage, perhaps as slaves, whose parents were of African
and Cherokee descent.211 Indeed, in an anthropological study conducted
between 1926 and 1928, more than 25 percent of the African American
population reported having Native American ancestry.212
Yet, the Freedmen’s roll systematically excluded evidence of Native
American ancestry, and agents refused to record it, even when proffers of
proof of “Indian blood” were made by enrollees themselves. For example,
Mary Walker, a woman of African-Cherokee heritage, attempted to enroll
as a Cherokee citizen “by blood,” after reciting her Cherokee ancestry to an
agent of the Dawes Commission. She was refused by a second agent
present, who insisted she be enrolled as a Freedman’s descendent, saying,
“She ain’t no Cherokee. She’s a nigger. That woman is a nigger and you are

Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 681
(2001).
208
Percentage of Cherokee population by state (1835): North Carolina (0.5), Georgia
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passed a rape law in 1839, it mandated the death penalty for the rape of a free woman
“lacking negro blood,” regardless of the race of the perpetrator; however, “the statute is
maddeningly silent” on whether the Nation even recognized the crime of rape of a black
woman, free or slave. Yarbrough, supra note 175, at 393. See also SCOTT L.
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going to put her down as a nigger.”213 If not excluding enrollees from the
“blood” rolls based on their appearance alone, Dawes agents channeled
enrollees like Mary Walker onto the Freedmen’s roll by applying the rule of
hypodescent, the so-called “one drop” rule, devised by Euroamerican slave
owners, whereby “a person who has one drop of Black blood is Black,”214
and therefore ineligible for inclusion on the Cherokee “blood” rolls.215
Because the Freedmen’s roll systematically omits proof of Cherokee
ancestry where such ancestry could be established by independent evidence,
and because there is no other Dawes roll on which such ancestry can appear,
the Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot serve as an accurate
resource for identifying all Cherokees by “blood.”216
Second, the Dawes Rolls elided the Cherokee ancestry of Africandescended persons by accepting only proof of Cherokee “blood” through
the applicant’s mother.217 Although, as we have seen, the AntiAmalgamation Act penalized intermarriage of both male and female
Cherokee citizens with “persons of color,” and imposed capital punishment
for the rape of Cherokee women by men of any race, it is unknown, as
historian Yarbrough states, whether Cherokee statutory law even penalized
sexual intercourse, consensual or non-consensual, between Cherokee men
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and African-descended women.218 Given the unequal positions of power
between Cherokee masters and their African slaves, and the disincentives
created by Cherokee law for intermarriage between black men and
Cherokee women, or rape of Cherokee women by black men, it is
reasonable to expect that the typical descendent of otherwise prohibited
interracial unions would be African-descended through the mother’s line.
The Dawes registration system, based on its own “amalgamation” of Indian
blood and matrilineal preference-making, shunted descendents of Cherokee
men and African women onto the Freedmen’s roll. Because this
“amalgamation” of race and matrilinearity resulted in reducing the roster of
persons otherwise eligible for inclusion on the Cherokee “blood” rolls, the
Dawes Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot serve as an accurate
resource for identifying all Cherokees by “blood.”
Third, biology is limited in its ability to establish citizenship when
otherwise-eligible persons choose not to participate in the legal process by
which biology-based citizenship is established.
When the Dawes
Commission came to enroll tribal members, many culturally conservative
Cherokees refused to participate, on the grounds that land severance
violated basic principles of Cherokee society. These Cherokees, like
similar-minded members of other tribes in Indian Territory, saw clearly that
break-up of their tribal land base was just the first step in a larger federal
project to destroy their indigenous cultures. Called “irreconcilables,” and
often associated with “full-bloodedness,” these tribal members adopted
individual and coordinated strategies to discourage other Cherokees from
enrolling, and to try to avoid the federal agents sent to seek them out.219
However, as Garroutte points out, “the descendents of those traditionalists
find themselves worse off, in the modern, legal context, for their forbearers’
success in the fight to maintain cultural integrity. By the criteria their tribes
have established, they can never become enrolled citizens.”220 The plight of
the “irreconcilables” shows that biology is a problematic predicate for
Cherokee citizenship when the legal regime establishing citizenship faces a
legitimacy-crisis in the eyes of a significant number of biologically-eligible
Cherokees. The story of the “irreconcilables” also indicates that biologybased citizenship requirements were problematic not only to the Freedmen,
but to a wider social constituency of the Nation. To the extent that
biological Cherokees refused to grant legitimacy to the Dawes Rolls by
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participating in enrollment, the Rolls are incomplete and therefore cannot
serve as an accurate resource for identifying all Cherokees by “blood.”
The problems of hypodescent, race-matrilinearity, and social legitimacy
identified above point to a more fundamental limitation on using biology to
establish Cherokee citizenship. The Dawes Rolls’ taxonomy of possible
Cherokee citizens is flawed because it rests upon the “long-discredited
belief that each race [has] its own blood type, which [is] correlated with
physical appearance.”221 It is quite likely that the Dawes agents who denied
Mary Walker enrollment on the “blood” rolls would have agreed with the
postulate of nineteenth-century race science that “blood will tell.”
The roots of race science can be traced to Samuel Morton, the
American scientist whose work from 1831 to 1851 rejected monogenesis
and the biblically-inspired single-origin theory of “the races” in favor of a
polygenetic theory of multiple human origins in multiple races, which was
still, however, based in Christian scripture.222 Morton ranked “the races” in
terms of intelligence and cultural superiority based on various features
(circumference, volume) of their skulls. Morton’s conclusions, which
placed Caucasians at the top of the hierarchy, consigned members of the
“colored races”—including both Indians and blacks—to the lower ranks,
and squared neatly with the racist ideology of southern planters, who
welcomed Morton’s work. On his death in 1851, a leading scientific
journal praised him, saying, “We of the South should consider him as our
benefactor, for aiding most materially in giving to the negro his true
position as an inferior race.”223
Morton was succeeded by Lewis Henry Morgan, whose Darwininspired theories of social evolution would prove highly influential in the
period when the Dawes Rolls were constructed. Morgan predicted the
imminent extinction of Native Americans as being biologically weaker—
frailer—than their white competitors, “the fittest,” who would “survive”
them.224 The notion that “races” compete for survival, and fare better or
worse based in part on their intrinsic qualities, readily tracked the racist
ideologies of the day and did nothing to disturb either the racial essentialism
underlying American public policy and popular opinion225 or
221
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(“American Polygeny and Craniometry before Darwin: Blacks and Indians as Separate,
Inferior Species”).
223
THOMAS, supra note 222, at 42.
224
The following account of Social Darwinism is indebted to THOMAS, supra, note
222, 44-51 (“Darwin and the Disappearing American Indian”) and 102-120 (“The Perilous
Idea of Race”)
225
High fertility rates among recent U.S. immigrants from southern and eastern Europe
during the period 1880 to 1920, and an influx of Irish immigrants, created great distress
among “native born” Americans, who articulated their fears in terms of race and decried
the “suicide of race” (Theodore Roosevelt). See Barry Edmonston & Jeffrey S. Passel,
How Immigration and Intermarriage Affect the Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S.
222
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anthropologists’ rankings of “the races” according to physiognomy.226 As a
result, “blood” still past from generation to generation, albeit now under the
twin constraints of inter-race competition and its own inherent, biological
limitations.
Progressive social science at the end of the nineteenth century,
therefore, carried forward the Euroamerican racial significations of previous
centuries, but authorized them within a new disciplinary matrix of federal
Indian law and policy.227 The plan of the federal government to allot tribal
lands to Indians in severalty, despite its often clumsy or corrupt
implementation in the field,228 represents the operation of law under the
conditions of race science: both science and “common sense” showed
Indians to be a weak and vanishing race, whose only hope lay in
assimilation and the embrace of private property; and “negroes” to be even
less evolved than Indians and naturally suited only for the subsistence
farming that their allotments would provide.229 That the biological theories
underpinning these social policies and their racist ideologies are utterly
false is now virtually beyond challenge.230 As Garroutte states:
Population, in IMMIGRATION AND OPPORTUNITY: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND EMPLOYMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 373, 374 (Frank D. Bean & Stephanie Bell-Rose, eds. 1999), cited and
discussed in L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 702, 752 n. 329 (2001).
226
“Although Morton’s belief in separate racial creations was largely forgotten after
the Civil War, the almost obsessive urge to classify human skulls into fixed, unchanging
races or hereditary “types” continued undiminished. During this period . . . mainstream
anthropology was still dividing humanity into a fixed number of races.” THOMAS, supra
note 222, at 103.
227
See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in TwentiethCentury Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1940 (2000) (“By the late nineteenth century,
the connection between whiteness and the ability to be part of the American body politic
had been underscored by race scientists, some working from the humanist traditions of
history and philosophy, and others working in the new fields of natural history opened up
by Charles Darwin and others.”).
228
See Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 275, 280 (2001)
(Dawes Rolls “blood quantum determinations were carelessly performed and routinely
inaccurate.”).
229
The “common sense” that accepted the rule of hypodescent in early twentieth
century America, for example, is reflected in views on the intelligence of persons of
African-European ancestry. As historian Murray Wickett reports, “[M]ost whites did
believe that they [black-white persons] were more intelligent than pure blacks. One
[Oklahoma] settler referred to a mulatto family that lived close by as ‘clean colored folks,
you know, they wasn’t . . . real dark. They . . . weren’t niggers you know. Just mulattos.”
MURRAY R. WICKETT, CONTESTED TERRITORY: WHITES, NATIVE AMERICANS AND
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN OKLAHOMA, 1865-1907 40 (2000). On the social and legal history
of “nigger,” see RANDALL KENNEDY, NIGGER: THE STRANGE CAREER OF A TROUBLESOME
WORD (2002). See also Michael A. Elliott, Telling the Difference: Nineteenth-Century
Legal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 611, 617 (“[L]aws that
defined race through biological ancestry became more common only after Reconstruction,
and the fraction of ‘blood’ requisite for African American identity most often decreased
after the turn of the twentieth century.”).
230
In the following quotation from legal scholar Scott Gould, “the Dawes Rolls”
may be substituted for “the census” to the same effect:
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A final concern [with] biological definitions of [Native
American] identity is their inextricable entanglement with the
notion of race. Biological definitions promote the notion that
“race” constitutes an objective, genetically based difference
between groups of people. Most Americans accept this
assumption, unaware that it runs contrary to most current
scientific knowledge, which tends to view racial distinctions as
significant social, but not biological, realities.231
Consequently, the wisdom of employing the Dawes Rolls as a
determinant of Native American identity must be questioned; especially,
though not only, the use of those rolls which claim to denote “Indians by
blood.” They should be questioned not because they are inaccurate
indicators of Native American ancestry for those listed (though they may be
that as well),232 but because they recapitulate a system of race hierarchies
based on bogus science.
D. From Biology to Ancestry, From Legal Fetishism to Law
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that a tribal citizenship system,
like that of the Cherokee Nation, which relies exclusively on the Dawes
Rolls, necessarily authorizes membership-determinations based on
nineteenth-century categories of race.233 The system does so not because of
the personal animus of present-day tribal leaders or registration officials
toward persons of color.234 The Dawes Rolls reflect in very specific ways,
Considerable doubt exists whether race can even be quantified scientifically.
Prior to the science of genetics, racial characterizations were believed to be
inherited by blood, hence the preoccupation with blood quanta in the census.
References to Indians as “full-bloods” and “mixed bloods” in the nineteenth
century (and persisting into the twenty-first) stem from this misconception.
Racial divisions based on genes are also proving unreliable . . . Indeed, the
recently completed mapping of the human genome suggests that humans and
their nearest primate relatives, the chimpanzees, may share an almost
identical set of genes. . . . There is no taxonomic basis in biology or
physiology to support the racial distinctions used by the U.S. Census.
Gould, supra note 225, at 754-55. See also Wright, supra note 227, at 53 (“Whatever the
word ‘race’ may mean elsewhere in the world, or to the world of science, it is clear that in
America the categories are arbitrary, confused, and hopelessly meaningless.”).
231
GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 58.
232
See id. at 24 (discussing the phenomenon of “five-dollar Indians”—white
homesteaders who bribed Dawes agents to be listed on the blood rolls).
233
“Southern historians should not be surprised that the concern with ‘blood’ that
Indians throughout the nation now share originated in the antebellum South where the
economic, social, and political system rested on the enslavement of one race by another.
The legacy of slavery was a regional obsession with race as a signifier of power.” PERDUE,
“MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 98.
234
Cherokee people, like others in the United States, are not immune from color bias.
Sturm’s interviews with individual Cherokees identified “a long-held Cherokee bias against
dark skin” and a bias toward light-skinned persons. STURM, supra note 58, at 189-90. One
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however, the effects of race hierarchies (and normative assumptions of
gender, legitimacy, property, and law) which are reproduced anew each
time the Nation processes an application for tribal membership and each
time the federal government does, or does not, issue a Certificate of Degree
of Indian Blood. For the Cherokee Nation, and perhaps for other Indian
nations who look to the Dawes Rolls for citizenship criteria, what seems to
be required is no less than the rescue of ancestry from biology.235
By “biology,” I mean the social construction of racial identities upon
heredity, as demonstrated in the history of Cherokee self-identity and
Cherokee citizenship requirements in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. If Cherokee national identity is to escape its continued
construction upon the effects of a spurious race science, Cherokees must be
attentive to their “official” genealogy’s structural and historical affiliation
with that false god, and re-imagine criteria of citizenship based not on
“Indian blood” but on new, non-racialized understandings of and
appreciation for Cherokee ancestry.236
But Cherokees must also rescue law from legalism—an attachment to
the authority of the Dawes Rolls that borders on fetishism.237 The power of
of her informants, speaking in the late 1990s, said, “Cherokees have always prided
themselves in being a light-skinned people.” Id. at 190. Sturm comments on this
statement, saying, “A Cherokee bias against dark skin, the result of their adaptation of a
system of African racial slavery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, provides the
simplest and more direct explanation for their social treatment and racial classification of
multiracial individuals with black ancestry even today.” Id.
235
On the distinction of race and ancestry in Native American tribes, as it pertains to
federal protections against race-based discrimination under the Fifteenth Amendment, see
Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, but Because of Ea: Rice v. Cayetano, 528
U.S. 495 (2000), 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 921, 950 (2001) (“The [concurring Justices’]
fixation on race is ill-founded when dealing with the political status of Indian tribal
membership. The color of one’s skin is not the determining factor for tribal membership; it
is one’s ancestry. For Indian tribes, ancestry need not be a proxy for race.”).
236
See Joyce A. McCray Pearson, Red and Black—A Divided Seminole Nation: Davis
v. U.S., 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 630 (2005) (“Yes, ancestry is important. But when
the truth about ancestry is obscured by man-made constructs and rules that divide people
purely along racial lines and the way they look, as in the case of the Dawes Rolls, it is
imperative that we take time to try and undo those wrongs.”); John Rockwell Snowden,
Wayne Tyndall & David Smith, American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It’s a
Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171, 236 (2001) (calling on tribes to reject race-based
citizenship criteria); and Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native
American History, Law and Culture: The Harry Batchelor Address, 13 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 11, 15 (2000) (on the irrational and culturally destructive effects of the Dawes Rolls
today).
237
On the idea of “legal fetishism” as a regard for legal regimes such as the Dawes
Rolls which fails to give sufficient attention to the role of the subject in producing,
interpreting, or organizing those regimes, see, e.g., Anthony Paul Farley, The Apogee of the
Commodity, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1229, 1233 (2004) (“We have been trained to see, and do
in fact see, the rules as if they determine the circumstances of their own application. This is
legal fetishism.”). Farley understands Euroamerican law in North America since the 17th
century as devoted to the commodification of blacks by whites: “A fetish is an artifact that
is treated as if it were not the product of human work. . . . Law, looked upon as if it were
something other than the force of the system of marks and the system of property, is a
fetish. Law, looked upon as if it were something other than white-over-black, is a fetish.
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the Dawes Rolls over Cherokee political identity is evident in the
citizenship provisions of the 1975 Constitution,238 the 1999 Constitution,239
the opinion of the Lucy Allen majority,240 and in the following statement by
Chief Smith, defending the race-impartiality of Cherokee citizenship
criteria:
The other thing that is clear is that the Cherokee Nation
Constitution is not based on race. People of many different
ethnic backgrounds, African Americans, white Americans and
Hispanic Americans, have Cherokee ancestors on the Dawes
Roll [sic]; and they are unquestionably entitled to Cherokee
Nation citizenship. However, someone will undoubtedly play the
race card in this debate.241
The attachment of Cherokee law to the Dawes Rolls is reminiscent of
the authority attached to another artifact of colonialism, the Bible (“the
English book”), when it was introduced to the people of India, as presented
by postcolonial theorist, Homi Bhabha:
The discovery of the book is, at once, a moment of originality
and authority. It is, as well, a process of displacement that,
paradoxically, makes the presence of the book wondrous to the
extent it is repeated, translated, misread, displaced. . . [T]he
emblem of the English book—‘signs taken for wonders’—[is] an

Law is white-over-black, white-over-black only, and that continually.” Id. at 1236. On the
fetishizing of human rights, to avoid dealing with structural social problems in the context
of South Africa, see RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001). See also Jack M.
Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal
Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993); Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Postmodern
Transition: Law and Politics, in THE FATE OF LAW 79 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns,
eds. 1991); and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading: Toward a
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 297 (1987).
238
CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. III, § 1 (1975) (“All members of
the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven by reference to the Dawes Commission
Rolls . . . .”).
239
CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, Art. IV, § 1 (1999) (“All citizens of the
Cherokee Nation must be original enrollees or descendants of original enrollees listed on
the Dawes Commission Rolls . . . .”).
240
“[T]he 1975 Constitution affirms these rights by linking citizenship to one single
document: the Dawes Rolls.” Lucy Allen, at 4. The Lucy Allen majority affirms the
importance of Cherokee ancestry (which it calls “blood”) while challenging the legal
hegemony that the Dawes Rolls exercises over Cherokee citizenship, stating, “It is not clear
that the Dawes Commission had any appreciation for the fact that Indian blood, of the
various tribes, is different. Shawnee blood is not Cherokee blood. Delaware blood is not
Cherokee blood. It is important for this Court to question whether all these federal blood
degrees really matter today, for purposes of Cherokee citizenship laws.” Id. at 8-9.
241
Freedmen Statement, supra note 17 (emphasis added).
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insignia of colonial authority and a signifier of colonial desire
and discipline.242
The Dawes Rolls, too, are such an “insignia” of colonial authority (over
Native Americans), desire (for land), and discipline (of Indians “by blood,”
and the “adopted” peoples: “Freedmen,” “Intermarried Whites,” and
“adopted” Shawnee and Delaware). Like the enunciation of “the English
book,” the action of Congress to close the rolls of the Cherokee Nation as of
March 4, 1907,243 was a moment of “originality and authority” for the tribe,
and, with each new member created, each Freedmen lawsuit, each struggle
over the right to set citizenship criteria, the authority of the Dawes Rolls has
grown ever more “wondrous.”244
In place of this legal fetishism of the Dawes Rolls, which alienates
Cherokees from their sovereign power of self-determination, I believe the
Cherokee Nation should begin to consider alternative criteria for
establishing national citizenship.245 In short, I believe Cherokees must
reclaim ancestry from biology and articulate a new political relationship to
their individual and collective pasts, one which does not use law to deploy
categories based on colonialist racial ideologies to exclude potential
citizens.
To decide the question of the Freedmen’s descendents’ status, I
suggest, Cherokee citizens, including the Freedmen’s descendents, should
engage in a searching dialogue on political and social identity, one that
expressly includes race. In the following part, I will elaborate a version of
the model of Radical Indigenism, articulated by Eva Garroutte, as one way
in which such a dialogue might be conducted, and explore how it could
organize discussion around the Freedmen controversy.

242

HOMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 145-46 (1994).
The rolls of the Cherokee Nation were closed by Act of Congress, April 26, 1906
(34 Stat. 137), effective March 4, 1907. After 1907, “some duplications were canceled,
and 312 names were added by act of Congress in 1914. DEBO, STILL THE WATERS RUN,
supra note 82, at 47.
244
See Mark Neath, American Indian Gaming Enterprises and Tribal Membership:
Race, Exclusivity, and a Perilous Future, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 689 (1995)
(“[T]hat federal practices that were designed to assimilate the Indian population employed
blood quantum as the measure of Indian identity suggests a deep irony in tribal acceptance
of similar blood quantum requirements.”)
245
The irony that the displaced tribes of Oklahoma, who lost much of their land bases
through allotment based on the method of “blood quantum,” would fixate on “blood
quantum” as an indicia of citizenship in their own nations is not lost on Perdue, who writes,
“[A]llotment rolls with their ‘blood quantum’ became the basis of modern tribal
membership, and in a great historical irony, the language of blood permeates tribal politics
into the twenty-first century.” PERDUE, “MIXED BLOOD,” supra note 112, at 98.
243
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III. RADICAL INDIGENISM AS A RESOURCE FOR RESOLVING THE FREEDMEN
CONTROVERSY
A. Foundational Commitments
The model of Radical Indigenism set forth by Garroutte attempts to
offer a way for academics to engage in scholarly research about Native
Americans while respecting the worldviews of the indigenous peoples they
study.246 As Garroutte explains, “radical” does not intend to connote either a
commitment to Marxist theory or an unnecessarily confrontational stance,
but rather a focus on the “root” (radix) of indigenous knowledge, and its
sources in the community and tradition:
Radical Indigenism illuminates differences in assumptions about
knowledge that are at the root of the dominant culture’s
misunderstanding and subordination of indigenous knowledge. It
argues for the reassertion and rebuilding of traditional
knowledge from its roots, its fundamental principles.247
I propose it, and adapt it, as a possible model by which indigenous
communities like the Cherokee Nation, who are struggling to define their
political identities, may do so from within their own assumptions and
methods and not in response to heteronymous criteria.248
Consistent with the above, therefore, a foundational commitment of the
model as I propose it is to the right of federally-recognized tribes to
determine their criteria for citizenship. 249 A corollary of this commitment is
the rejection of the view, expressed by some scholars, that Congress should
exercise its plenary power over Indian tribes, or federal courts should

246

GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 101-104 (identifying Radical Indigenism and
distinguishing it from both “academic colonialism” and postcolonial theory).
247
Id. at 101.
248
The version of Radical Indigeneity that I propose has resonance with the project set
forth in Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 191, 196 (2001) (“[Cultural sovereignty is] the effort of Indian nations and Indian
people to exercise their own norms and values in structuring their collective futures”); and
id. at 197 (“[T]he central challenge of cultural sovereignty is to reach an understanding of
sovereignty that is generated from within tribal societies and carries a cultural meaning
consistent with those traditions.”) (emphasis in original). In my view, however, the
challenge tribal self-governance faces today argues for, rather than against, an enhanced
role for political sovereignty; hence my first foundational commitment, infra notes 249-50
and accompanying text.
249
The first foundational commitment is my own and does not necessarily reflect
Garroutte’s understanding of Radical Indigenism, though I believe it is consistent with the
version of the model she presents in REAL INDIANS.
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expand their interpretations of existing laws, to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity and limit the scope of permissible tribal citizenship criteria.250
A second basic commitment of the model is to the rationality of
indigenous worldviews, “that American Indian (and other indigenous)
philosophies of knowledge are rational, articulable, coherent logics for
ordering and knowing the world.”251 Thus, no matter how different from
Euroamerican conceptions of the world an indigenous worldview may be,252
it remains possible in theory to specify that worldview in terms of tribal or
band membership criteria, and in the case of indigenous groups that are
patterned after nations, in terms of citizenship criteria.
A third strong commitment of the model is to the modest role any one
person should play in the articulation of both problems and solutions
affecting one’s tribe; in this regard, I echo Garroutte, herself a citizen of the
Cherokee Nation, when she says that “[w]hat follows is not meant as a
prescription for how tribes should think about identity issues; rather, it is a
suggestive exploration of a place from which they might begin to work out
their own definitions of identity with the participation of all their
members.”253 This implies a corresponding commitment on the part of
individual tribal members to submit individual notions of citizenship criteria
to the test of collective deliberation by the tribe as a whole.

250

See, e.g., Eric Reitman, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally
Recognized Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 863
(2006) (“Bearing in mind the destructive potential of plenary membership power . . .
Congress should exercise its power over federally recognized Indian tribes and abrogate, at
least in part, tribal citizenship power.”); Williamson, supra note 170, at 262-68 (urging
action by executive agencies, Congress, and courts to protect Freedmen’s descendents from
“discriminatory tribal policies” by imposing federal equal protection guarantees); Pratt,
Tribes and Tribulations, supra note 170, at 113-14 (urging action by Congress to grant
citizenship to Freedmen’s descendents where “self-determination becomes an oppressive
tool used to exclude some Indians on the basis of race. . . . [W]hen the restriction or
limitation on tribal membership is rooted in notions of racial superiority, it does not serve
any legitimate purpose.”); Pratt, Tribal Kulturkampf, supra note 216, at 1260 (“The use of
sovereign immunity to protect tribal identity . . . ignores the racist origins of the legal rules
that define Indian Seminole identity and serves to further subjugate people of color,
specifically black Indians, by continuing the enforcement of the corrupt rule of hypodescent.”). For arguments rejecting the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity and the
compromise of the right of tribes to set citizenship criteria, see esp. Riley, supra note 39;
Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 104. See also Carole Goldberg, American Indians
and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 943 (2002) (responding to equalitybased challenges to Indian law); and Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1373 (2002) (analyzing the race-ing of Indians in federal law).
251
GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 113.
252
There is of course an extensive literature on the differences between Euroamerican
and Native American worldviews and spiritual traditions. From indigenous perspectives,
see, e.g., VINE DELORIA, GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION (30th anniversary ed.
2003); and AMERICAN INDIAN THOUGHT (Anne Waters, ed. 2004) (philosophical essays by
indigenous authors).
253
GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 113.
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B. Assumptions of the Model
The version of Radical Indigenism that I propose offers three
assumptions for guiding dialogue about tribal political identity. The first
two, practicality and spirituality, are derived from Garroutte; the third,
reflection on the effects of colonization, is my own.
1.

Role of Practical Knowledge

The first assumption of the model emphasizes the practical quality of
the pursuit of knowledge. Knowledge exists first and foremost for the sake
of making a concrete difference in the lived world of tribal members. This
means, as Garroutte states, that the definition of tribal identity must “be
robust, allowing for sufficiently strong community boundaries”:
But it should be flexible as well, because flexibility allows for
the embrace of those who truly belong to the community, even if
they do not satisfy certain technical criteria of membership.
Flexibility allows the community to remain open to the entry of
new and valued resources.254
Freedmen’s descendents, as well as members of the other “adopted”
groups who contribute to the life of the Nation, have a stake as citizens in
constructing membership criteria that are robust: clear, bright-line rules that
establish boundaries between citizens and non-citizens. For the reasons
discussed above, the exclusive authority of the Dawes Rolls should be
abandoned.255 In dialogue with Cherokees by ancestry, new legal
touchstones could be identified for citizenship. These might include
Cherokee census rolls prepared prior to the Dawes Rolls by Cherokees
themselves;256 rolls in dispute that allegedly include names of Freedmen or
their descendents that were elided by the Dawes Rolls (Wallace Roll, KernClifton Roll); some combination of these rolls; or rolls plus other indicia of

254

Id. at 115 (emphasis in original).
I acknowledge it would be difficult to achieve this decentering. As Carole Goldberg
has observed, “Once a roll is established as the basis for citizenship, it becomes politically
difficult to expand citizenship beyond its confines.” Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note
104, at 458. Nonetheless, the assumption of practicality requires citizenship criteria to be
flexible, as well as bounded, and for that reason I propose the alternatives set forth above.
256
Justice Leeds, writing for the Lucy Allen majority, noted that “[t]he Dawes Rolls
were not created by the federal government from scratch. When the Dawes Commission
compiled its rolls, they referred to previous Cherokee Nation census records which also
included a broad citizenry. Most of the people listed on the Dawes Rolls will also appear
on the Cherokee Nation’s own tribally censuses that pre-date the Dawes Rolls. The
Cherokee Nation’s own censuses included Freedmen in addition to ‘native Cherokees,’
intermarried whites, and Indians of other tribes, all of whom were recognized by the
Cherokee Nation as citizens.” Lucy Allen, at 6.
255
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genealogical connection deemed reliable by the Nation (on analogy with the
“ancient documents” exception to the hearsay rule).257
The aim of this reform is two-fold: to decenter the Dawes Rolls as the
exclusive authority for Cherokee citizenship and subordinate the Dawes
Rolls to a larger genus, determined by the tribe, which might be called,
simply, “reliable records”; and, second, to introduce flexibility into
citizenship criteria by creating a range of authorities through which a
prospective tribal member could attempt to establish citizenship. One can
imagine a default system which privileged a certain set of rolls for
citizenship, accompanied by a principled mechanism for vetting special
cases, where those whose ancestors had failed to enroll, or whose
enrollment allegedly had been lost, could attempt to establish ancestral
relationship with the Nation, perhaps by means of “ancient documents.”
This would respect the role of practical knowledge to establish citizenship
criteria that are both robust and flexible.
2.

Relationship to Spiritual Heritage

The second assumption of Radical Indigenism focuses on the
“attentiveness” of Native American communities to “the distinctly spiritual
dimensions of inquiry.”258 Garroutte focuses on the sense of many tribes
that they have “a specific spiritual role to play in the world: a particular
place to occupy and a particular task to perform.”259 Tribal stories of origin
often embody charges variously called “Original Instructions” or “First
Instructions,” which “usually concern coming into relationship with other
beings—human and nonhuman—in the natural world in particular ways.”260
Garroutte observes that “[a] definition of identity that acknowledges this
spiritual heritage will recall each tribal community to its Original
Instructions—to its specific teachings about the nature of the world and how
its members are to live in it.”261 Further, because tribes routinely interact
with non-members, those engaged in dialogue on the spiritual dimensions of
their identity will ask who should be invited “to join them in their sacred
work,” that is, who should be asked to share the burden of executing the
Original Instructions that frame their lives.262
The Cherokee Nation expressly understands itself as performing a
unique and sacred mission in the world. In document entitled Declaration of
Designed Purpose, prepared by the “Chad Smith-Hastings Shade
administration” and dated 2001, the Cherokee Nation elaborates a statement
of “vision, mission and guiding principles to lead the Cherokee Nation for
257

The “ancient documents” exception to the hearsay rule as codified in the Federal
Rules of Evidence allows into evidence probative “statements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.” F.R.E. Rule 803 (16).
258
GARROUTTE, supra note 40, at 114 (emphasis in original).
259
Id. at 115.
260
Id.
261
Id. at 115-16.
262
Id. at 116.
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the 21st century.”263 Citing the words of early-twentieth century Cherokee
traditionalist Redbird Smith (“I have always believed that the Great Creator
had a great design for my people, the Cherokees”), the Declaration lists
“Spirit” as the first “guiding principle” for “the decisions that drive the
behaviors, feelings, and attributes necessary” for achieving desired tribal
outcomes.264 Under “Spirit,” the Declaration states, “We believe that the
Creator has a great design for us and acknowledge that every Cherokee is
part of the ever-renewing, ever-expanding, upward progressive movement
of life.”265 The Declaration is consistent with other official statements of
the Nation in acknowledging the significance of spirituality for Cherokee
identity, but not imposing a specific theology, creed, or set of religious
practices as a litmus-test for citizenship.266 Other Cherokees put it more
plainly: in the words of Julie M., a Keetoowah grandmother interviewed by
Garroutte, “We [Cherokees] . . . have a special place in the world. God put
us here.”267
The construction of Cherokee Nation citizenship criteria according to
Radical Indigenism, therefore, would assume the salience of Cherokee
spiritual self-understanding to the dialogue. Whether the Declaration of
Designed Purpose endures is less important for a dialogue on citizenship
than the legitimacy of religious discourse found among many Cherokee
people as a means of expressing their fundamental orientation in the world.
Sturm points out while “many Cherokees share a common spiritual
cosmology,” the religious beliefs and practices of Oklahoma Cherokee are
complex, and practitioners typically consist of Cherokee Baptists (a
variation of Southern Baptists, inflected by elements of traditional Cherokee
culture and religion) and practitioners of traditional Cherokee religion
centered on the Sacred Fire (the Keetoowah Society).268 Cherokees, whether
descendents of Freedmen, “blood Indians,” or others, would be expected to
engage in a conversation where citizenship is understood as more than the
263

Declaration of Designed Purpose, Cherokee Phoenix and Indian Advocate, Fall
2001, http://www.cherokee.org/Phoenix/XXVno4_Fall2001/ddp1.htm (last visited August
16, 2006).
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Id. The “desired outcomes” are listed as “exercise sovereignty,” “achieve optimal
performance [by setting ‘benchmarks’ for ‘each operating team’],” “build Cherokee Nation
employees,” “encourage tribal members,” and “use culture/knowledge.” Id.
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Id.
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Article III, Section 4 of the 1999 Cherokee Constitution provides “[t]he Council
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” The 1999 Constitution includes
no correlate to the federal Establishment Clause. The Preamble of the 1999 Constitution
“acknowledges with humility and gratitude the goodness, aid and guidance of the
Sovereign Ruler of the Universe” in allowing the “People of the Cherokee Nation” to
“preserve our sovereignty, enrich our culture, achieve and maintain a desirable measure of
prosperity and the blessings of freedom.” See Comparison of the 1976 and 1999
Constitutions,
(last
http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/Executive/CCC/ccc1999Changes.pdf
visited August 16, 2006).
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GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 115 (emphasis in original).
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STURM, supra note 58, at 127. The complexities of race, religion, and Cherokee
identity are considered by Sturm, id. at 124-31.
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negotiation of a social contract, but rather represents the interpretation of
sacred “Original Instructions.”269 Understood as a discussion guided by
Cherokee assumptions about their place in the world, a conversation on
citizenship would explore whether the Freedmen’s descendents have a civic
role to play in the Nation’s “designed purpose,” and how that role, if it
exists, might best be performed.
3.

Effective History of Colonization

Third, I would add to Garroutte’s model the assumption that the social
construction of Native American identities proceeds within a political, legal,
and rhetorical matrix that embodies centuries of Euroamerican domination
and indigenous peoples’ resistance.270 As a result, tribal members’
constructs of themselves and “others” may consciously or unconsciously
reflect ideologies of race, class, and other divisions, which implicitly
devalue Native Americans themselves and marginalize Native Americans’
access to their own histories and cultures.271 The assumption of the
effective history272 of colonization, therefore, also will inform the model.
The dialogue on Cherokee citizenship would presume the relevance of
Euroamerican history for the Nation, not as a story of Cherokee victimhood
or triumphalism, but as a story of colonization cutting across lines of tribe,
race, gender, and economic status. The dialogue would be difficult and
would of necessity include a searching look at how Cherokee government
has been influenced by and at times embraced (in academic jargon)
Euroamerican racial hegemony and ideology. Of necessity, the dialogue
would ask participants to consider the history of the Freedmen, and explore
how their history and that of the Cherokees “by blood” have intersected
under the influence of colonialism, and how that influence may continue to
shape even the dialogue itself.
269

In 1996 the Nation reported that approximately 39 percent of its citizens lived
outside Oklahoma. Id. at 11. This large non-resident population poses particular difficulties
for such a dialogue, since one cannot assume a common religious culture among residents
of states as diverse as California and Texas (to name two states where many Cherokees
reside), where Cherokee identity may be predicated on other values.
270
See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (critical legal history of Euroamerican
engagement with indigenous peoples of the Americas).
271
On the uses and limits of critical social theory for understanding Native American
identity politics, see STURM, supra note 58, at 19-26. See also Russel Lawrence Barsh, The
Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277 (1993) (on
harsh impact of colonialism on social and political trends in Indian Country).
272
“Effective history” is a concept taken from the work of philosopher Hans-Georg
Gadamer, and means, in this context, the abiding impact of Euroamerican colonization on
indigenous peoples and their apprehension of the world. See Francis J. Mootz III, The
Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work
of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur 68 B.U. L. REV. 523, 529 (1988) (“understanding is
never subjective behaviour toward a given 'object,' but towards its effective history—the
history of its influence”) (quoting HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD xix
(1960; trans. 1975)).
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The three assumptions stated above—practicality, spirituality, and an
effective history of colonization—may be described as three values for
Cherokee citizenship criteria: a good criterion must serve the practical
function of distinguishing members and non-members while remaining
flexible to changing circumstances; it must respond to an overarching
Cherokee vision of the tribe’s purpose in the world, and it must be attuned
to how the inheritance of colonialism may be at work in the Nation today.
How, then, to proceed?
C. Critical Hermeneutics of Ancestry and Reciprocity
The point of departure for many tribal communities seeking to
understand themselves, Garroutte, writes, is tradition. “A common
assumption of American Indian knowledge pursuits,” she states, “is that the
seeker always looks backwards.”273 The bearers of tradition include tribal
elders, whose reflections on tribal identity should central to the dialogue;
oral and written narratives of the tribe’s history, its creation myths, and
other bodies of teachings; and the “records of historic practice and forms of
community life or social structure.”274 By triangulating among elders’
statements, oral and written tribal narratives, and community social forms,
testing each body of evidence against the others, tribal members, acting
collectively, can identify traditional tribal principles. With Garroutte, I
propose that a useful principle of identity, which is consonant with the
traditional principles of many tribes, is that of kinship.275 Below I will
examine how kinship operates in two modes for determining tribal
citizenship: the relationship to ancestry and the responsibility to reciprocity.
1.

Relationship to Ancestry

Legal scholar Angela Riley writes, “Indian tribes reflect the most
intimate associations of human experience: they are, by definition, families.
Indian tribes are bound by bloodlines, clan identifiers, and kinship.
Ancestry or descent often constitutes the dominant factor in determining
whether one belongs to an Indian tribe.”276 Carole Goldberg observes,
“biological relationship has always formed some part, often a significant
part, of tribal belonging.”277 Garroutte notes that for some Native
Americans, such as author Scott Momaday, the relationship to one’s
ancestors can only be expressed as a “memory in the blood,” a heritable
“race memory” that flows from one generation to the next.278 Rather than
reject such expressions out of hand as fragments of colonialist racial
hegemony, Garroutte finds that when understood in the context of
273
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traditional authorities (elders’ statements and sacred stories), claims such as
Momaday’s do not exhibit the characteristics of nineteenth-century race
science, but show “a sacred logic to which notions of genealogical distance
and blood quantum are foreign and even irrelevant.”279 Garroutte invites us
to consider the possibility of indigenous (sacred) and non-indigenous
(colonialist) essentialisms, and to embrace the former as legitimate modes
of establishing Native American kinship and thus identity.280
Garroutte’s efforts to distinguish race-based notions of ancestral
affinity such as Momaday’s from the racist notions of biological hierarchies
criticized earlier in this Article are intriguing, but would be more
persuasive, I believe, had she incorporated the third assumption of an
effective history of colonialism. Taken alone, the traditional authorities of
elders’ testimony, sacred texts, and community practices are not exempt
from the influences of colonialism:281 as Garroutte herself clearly sees, there
are no “pristine” tribal cultural resources to draw on;282 therefore, a criticalhistorical perspective is needed to prevent the hermeneutic of traditional
principles such as kinship from automatically reproducing and reentrenching colonialist ideologies as the basis for citizenship criteria.
Such a critical hermeneutic of tribal tradition would operate within
tribes themselves, to identify and discard—or retain—notions of race,
gender, and other forms of difference that have inflected and formed their
traditional authorities over the course of perhaps centuries. An exploration
of operative colonialist essentialisms would also create the logical space
within which tribes could identify and discuss examples of kinship
consistent with Garroutte’s “indigenous essentialism.” The resulting
citizenship criteria may not satisfy critics of tribal sovereign immunity, who
would utilize extra-tribal criteria to avoid outcomes “anathema in a society
279

Id. at 125.
See id. at 122-25.
281
Examples of tribal stories of origin or revelation inflected by the race-values of
colonialism are common. See, e.g., the syncretic Shawnee-Christian version of the Garden
of Eden story, in which the Great Spirit (God) visits punishments on his three disobedient
children—white, red, and black—appropriate to “an ineradicable hierarchy of races,” in
McLoughlin, Red Indians, supra note 132, at 378. See also id. at 373-74 (Seneca and
Shawnee theological constructs incorporating racial hierarchies). On issues raised today by
the religious syncretism of Christian and indigenous spiritualities, see, e.g., Theresa S.
Smith, The Church of the Immaculate Conception: Inculturation and Identity among the
Anishnaabeg of Manitoulin Island, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL
READER 145-56, 146-47 (Lee Irwin, ed. 2000).
282
Garroutte criticizes very effectively the myth of Indian essentialism in GAROUTTE,
supra note 40, at 67-69, referencing the trial of the Mashpees, who failed to establish
sufficient “Indian-ness” to assert a claim for lost ancestral lands. See also JAMES CLIFFORD,
Identity in Mashpee, in THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE 323 (1988) (logic of cultural
“authenticity” makes no allowance for “sharp contradictions, mutations, or emergencies”
that comprise lived history); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Frontiers of Legal Thought
III: Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990
DUKE L.J. 625 (Mashpees’ story rendered unintelligible and thus legally irrelevant by
dominant culture’s history and social practices); and GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 136-39
(disavowing static notions of tradition and defining indigenous traditions as modes of
thinking and acting that correspond to tribes’ sacred Original Instructions).
280

20-Aug-06]

CHEROKEE FREEDMEN

63

ruled by laws”283 (and their own preferences), but the criteria would be the
result of an intra-tribal process where traditional principles, such as kinship,
were generated only after the effective historical consequences of
colonialism had been “named” and debated.
While kinship ties are typically obtained by birth within a tribal
community, they can also be created through adoption. While the clan
system still operated as the primary unit of society, Cherokee “[c]lans
frequently adopted prisoners of war to supplement their own numbers and
to replace kinsmen who had died or been killed.”284 White men in the late
1700s who associated themselves with Cherokee towns were occasionally
adopted by clans but usually not.285 In the nineteenth century, as the clan
system was overtaken by the model of citizenship, “American men who
married Cherokee women could then seek legal rights in the Cherokee
Nation without participating in the traditional ritual of adoption.”286 When
the Cherokees adopted the Freedmen and their descendents into the Nation
by the Treaty of 1866 and constitutional amendments of 1866, and later
extended citizenship to intermarried whites, Shawnee, and Delaware, they
did so against a background of Cherokee adoption practices which, while
never extensive or a challenge to the primacy of ancestry, were nonetheless
sufficiently common to have engendered their own rituals.287
Garroutte argues that the “kinship substance” communicated through
birth may also be ritually transferred through adoption ceremonies.
Referring to the rituals of the Iroquois, she states, “[adoptees] entered the
ceremony as one kind of being, and they emerged another. The kinship
substance thus acquired is real and consequential, enabling new
relationships—both social and physical.”288 Examples of Native American
adoption practices, she argues, “challenge the accusation that essentialist
claims are necessarily racist: the essentialisms explored here have nothing
to with the idea of race, a concept rooted in the same biologistic
assumptions that have driven social scientific studies of kinship.”289
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Reitman, supra note 250, at 804.
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Garroutte’s analysis of the traditional principle of kinship leads her to
conclude that ancestry is not the only way that some tribes establish fullfledged membership. While genealogical relationship remains primary for
most tribes, the possibility exists, “at least in principle, for people of any
race to be brought into kinship relations through the transformative
mechanism of ceremony.”290 Here again, however, it would seem advisable
to avoid the unreflective application of adoption practices, perhaps
developed for a different age, or under the conditions of colonialism, to
tribal communities.291 Ceremonies of transformation (e.g., baptisms and bar
mitzvahs, to choose two common non-indigenous examples) exist to
perform operative acts on individuals through correct ritual performance:
when properly done, the individual is a substantially different person with
new social rights and obligations.292 The model of Radical Indigeneity, as I
propose it, assumes the critical assessment of tribal ceremonies of adoption
and the identification of their implicit or express assignment of social,
racial, and gender roles prior to their implementation by tribes.
A question that a Cherokee dialogue with the Freedmen’s descendents
might wish to ask is whether the Nation possesses, or cares to recover or
create, such transformative mechanisms of adoption, and make them
available to the Freedmen’s descendents, particularly inasmuch as the
descendents’ political identity as citizens appears to hinge on successfully
negotiating their social identity as Cherokee “kin.” Claiming political
membership in the polity based on what some regard as a “shot-gun” treaty
and an unpopular judicial decision is no substitute for negotiating social
legitimacy as Cherokees. Without the latter, achieved through difficult,
face-to-face dialogues among all affected parties, it is doubtful whether the
former—citizenship status—can be long maintained. The responsibility to
reciprocity, described below, may offer hope for such a negotiation of social
legitimacy.
2.

Responsibility to Reciprocity

If, as Garroutte notes, relationship to ancestry represents Native
American being, the second dimension of kinship, responsibility to
reciprocity, indicates Native doing: what religious studies scholar
Christopher Jocks describes as the “ability to participate in kinship.”293 To
290

Id.
See John Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, The Colonization of Consciousness, in A
READER IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION 493-510, 507 (2002) (in the context of South
Africa,, distinguishing two levels in the colonization of consciousness: conversion by an
ideological message, and “inculcation of the hegemonic forms, the taken-for-granted signs
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JOHN SKORUPSKI, SYMBOL AND THEORY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THEORIES OF
RELIGION IN SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 101 (1976) (“Operative actions are performed in
order to create or cancel a set of rights and obligations.”).
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GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 118; quoting Christopher Jocks, American Indian
Religious Traditions and the Academic Study of Religion: A Response to Sam Gill, 65
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF RELIGION 169-76, 172 (1997).
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understand this dimension I believe it is necessary to appreciate how very
differently indigenous communities and Euroamerican societies conceive
the basis of social obligation. For those acculturated in the Enlightenment’s
tradition of atomistic agency, obligations arise paradigmatically through the
free actions of autonomous individuals, represented in the classic notion of
contract as a “bargained-for exchange of promises.”294
Tribal communities, on the other hand, often understand themselves as
existing in fundamental relationship with their physical surroundings; not as
societies floating in incidental or accidental relation to particular geographic
spaces, but as distinct peoples dwelling within a web of physical, spiritual,
and moral relationships with places.295 Native American spiritual traditions
are often, though not always, site-specific, meaning that the religious and
cultural identities of the people, and their ethical obligations,296 depend
upon particular places where the Original Instructions—the purpose of the
tribe for the world—can be competently interpreted by the elders, medicine
men and women, and other qualified tribal members, or effectively
performed in ceremonies of renewal.297
Further, for many tribes, dwelling implies engagement in highly
interpersonal relations with a broader ontology than that recognized by
Western philosophy and science: animals, plants, people, gods, geological
forms, meteorological events, celestial entities, and spirit beings, to name
but a few.298 This dwelling, and these relationships, constitute a web of life
294

“Contract. An agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation
to do or not to do a particular thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (5th ed.)
295
See KEITH H. BASSO, WISDOM DWELLS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND LANGUAGE
AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE (1996), esp. 3-135 (on Apache place-making) and 106-107
(“dwelling is said to consist in the multiple ‘lived relationships’ that people maintain with
places, for it is solely by virtue of these relationships that space acquires meaning.”)
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Deloria writes, “Spatial thinking requires that ethical systems be related directly to
the physical world and real human situations, not abstract principles, are believed to be
valid at all times and under all circumstances. One could project, therefore, that space must
in a certain sense precede time as a consideration for thought.” DELORIA, GOD IS RED,
supra note 252, at 72.
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There is an extensive literature addressing the efforts of Native Americans to
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Kristin A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place
for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2005) (arguing that “Indian
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located on federal public lands.”). For a sense of how far federal constitutional
jurisprudence has not come since the pivotal case, Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective
Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (no Free Exercise Clause protection, absent
governmental coercion, for burdens on religious liberty of Pacific Northwest Indian tribes’
religious uses of public lands, where logging road’s construction would devastate tribal
culture and religion), see the analysis of the court in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service,
408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 904 (2006) (applying Lyng to find no Religious Freedom Restoration
Act protection, absent governmental coercion, for burdens on religious liberty of Navajo,
Apache, Hopi and other tribes, where expansion of snowmaking on sacred San Francisco
Peaks using graywater would devastate tribal culture and religion).
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Deloria expressly describes the relationship of humans and other species as one of
kinship: “The essence of the Indian attitude toward peoples, lands, and other life forms is
one of kinship relations in which no element of life can go unattached from human society.
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which serves as the basis for reciprocal interactions. As Garroutte notes,
while social science defines kinship in terms of human descent, many
Native Americans view kinship, and the obligations of kinship, much more
broadly, to encompass all that is.299
The critical interpretation of what Deloria calls the “Indian attitude”
toward people, land, and other life forms does not require one to bracket the
truth or falsity of indigenous claims about reality, much less deny them. The
elders’ accounts of aboriginal history, stories of origination (of the cosmos,
people, animals, and other kin), the complex medicines that keep the world
in balance, and the social structures and rituals that embody the teaching
and continuation of the “Indian attitude” cannot be challenged from within a
critical hermeneutics oriented by the assumptions of Radical Indigeneity.
At the same time, it is appropriate to ask, from within one’s tribal
community, to what extent the tribe’s present-day understanding of
indigenous kinship relations reflects Euroamerican biases of, for example,
space, time, history, and community.300 It is especially important in this
regard to examine the influence of Christianity on understandings of
kinship, where many tribal spiritual traditions for centuries came under the
influence of missionaries.301 Indeed, the critical examination of such
understandings of kinship may serve as an act of cultural recovery. Critical
assessment of traditional source material and dialogue with the community
and its elders can reveal where, for example, Western dichotomies between
irreconcilable “spiritual” and “material” worlds, “souls” and “bodies,”
“rational animals” and “irrational nature,” or incompatible “subjects” and
“objects” may have elided indigenous worldviews and attenuated the scope
of kinship responsibilities, including responsibilities of political
participation, that tribes may wish to resume, insofar as they can.
The “common spiritual cosmology”302 shared by many Cherokees,
often foregrounded by individual commitments to Christianity or the
Keetoowah Society, provides the basis for strong indigenous kinship
relations which bear directly on Cherokee identity. Sturm’s informants
. . . With respect to other life forms, this attitude manifests itself in what one could call
‘kinship’ cycles of responsibility that exists between our species and other species.” VINE
DELORIA, JR., Native American Spirituality, in FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN
AMERICA 131 (James Treat, ed. 1999).
299
GAROUTTE, supra note 40, at 132 (“Humans are merely one set of participants in the
vast cycles of giving and receiving, of covenant and celebration, that constitute relationship
to a tribal kinship community.”).
300
See, e.g., DELORIA, GOD IS RED, supra note 252, at 61-75 (“Thinking in Time and
Space”); id. at 97-112 (“The Concept of History”).
301
See, e.g., DELORIA, Christianity and Indigenous Religion: Friends or Enemies?, in
FOR THIS LAND, supra note 298, at 145-61; NATIVE AND CHRISTIAN: INDIGENOUS VOICES
ON RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (James Treat, ed. 1996); and
Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49
STAN. L. REV. 773 (1997).
302
STURM, supra note 58, at 127. The best-known Euroamerican account of the
Cherokee cosmology is the work of 19th-century anthropologist, James Mooney. See
MOONEY, supra note 129.
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emphasize that “[s]pirituality is the most important thing in the traditional
Cherokee world because we use it to maintain life as we know it and to
survive through periods of turmoil” and “[a] Cherokee has to be brought up
knowing their culture, the medicine way of life. They have to go out into
the woods and know roots and foods and medicine.” However, they also
state, “But [Cherokees] also need to be able to survive with European
ways.” Another informant stated, “Cherokee religion is real important to
me. . . . Me and my family, we visit with the medicine man and the little
people. I know the difference between good and bad medicine, even if I
have a college degree.”303 For these Cherokees, negotiating Euroamerican
“ways” occurs against the background of a rich and expansive kinship
system which implies relationships of reciprocity.
The Cherokee Nation in its Declaration of Designed Purpose appears
to allude to such a larger notion of kinship, when it states, in a section
captioned “Identity”:
The government of the Cherokee Nation acknowledges that
Cherokee identity has been formulated over time and consists of
shared patterns of behavior that include language, ceremony,
customs, values, beliefs, traditions, wisdom and knowledge,
along with other tangible and intangible forces, that combined
are referred to as the Cherokee lifeways or culture.304
More specifically, the Declaration declares that “[t]he Mission of the
Cherokee Nation is ‘ga du gi’—working together as individuals, families
and communities for a quality of life for this and future generations by
promoting confidence, Cherokee culture and an effective sovereign
government.”305 Chief Smith and his administration have made ga-du-gi
the organizing principle of national life. In his 2005 Status Report to the
Nation, Chief Smith stated:
As Cherokees well know, the best way to get anything done is
the traditional way of working together, ga-du-gi. In order to
keep our communities strong now and into the next century, we
are applying the concept of ga-du-gi in every department,
program and business at the Cherokee Nation. To do this we
have passed a law that requires a self-help component for all of
our programs. . . . Community. Jobs. Language. Deputy
Principal Chief Joe Grayson and I continue our commitment to
the true community spirit of Cherokee people, ga-du-gi, to
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Id. at 126-27. The reference to “the little people” or Yunwi Tsunsdi, refers to a
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are respected. See MOONEY, supra note 129, at 333-34.
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providing economic opportunity, and to our distinct Cherokee
Culture.306
I would argue that ga-du-gi—“all working together”—is a particular
manifestation of a Cherokee kinship system which links citizens with that
larger world referenced by the Cherokee cosmology. As prosaic and
“Western” as a call for cooperation and self-help may seem to be, it would
be a mistake to infer from the Declaration or Status Report that either its
author or intended audience understand ga-du-gi as merely an exhortation
to “pitch in and pull together”: the invocation of a formative Cherokee
concept in the sacred Cherokee language would evoke for both speaker and
listener an obligation to realize their “designed purpose” for the sake of the
world.307
This second dimension of kinship, relationship to reciprocity,
challenges Cherokees “by blood” and Freedmen’s descendents who are
interested in citizenship to discuss and determine their respective roles in
the world according to ga-du-gi as the social expression of the traditional
Cherokee cosmology, as interpreted by the elders and found in the tribe’s
texts, stories, and communal structures. Many Freedmen’s descendents
“possess as much if not more Cherokee culture” than “white-Cherokees.”308
As Marilyn Vann has said, Freedmen’s descendents “know a lot more about
a stomp dance, hog fry, and wild onion dinner than anything about
Africa.”309 This suggests that some descendents may share assumptions
with “blood” Cherokees regarding the cosmos and its familial
interconnections. There may be shared cultural roots to sustain the moral
imperatives of ga-du-gi. Stated differently, how would Freedmen’s
descendents contribute to ga-du-gi, the up-building of the Nation, and the
articulation and performance of the Nation’s “designed purpose”? And
what, in turn, are the obligations of ga-du-gi from “blood” Cherokees to the
descendents of their former slaves, now fellow citizens? A dialogue
between these groups, as difficult as it would be, could strive to identify and
articulate shared cultural roots to help them assess whether the political
definition of Cherokees today ought to continue to include citizenship for
the Freedmen’s descendents.
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CONCLUSION
To return to Marilyn Vann’s pointed question, is the Cherokee Nation
“a race or a nation?” Clearly, it is a nation. But will it be a nation based on
race? At this crossroads in Cherokee history, the controversy in the
Cherokee Nation over the political status of the Freedmen’s descendents has
tended to frame the options for voters as a choice between “blood” or base
rolls: citizenship as a reflection of Cherokee lineal descent or citizenship as
a function of a legal regime embedded in the federal Dawes Rolls. Though
the two options intertwine in effect—the Dawes Rolls authorize which
“blood” will lead to citizenship—they are analytically distinct. As I have
attempted to show in this Article, neither alternative is adequate to resolve
the crisis of Cherokee political and social identity.
The rights of citizenship promised to Freedmen and their descendents
by the Treaty of 1866 and the 1866 amendments to the Cherokee
Constitution have been consistently and effectively resisted by tribal
leadership virtually since they were announced. The listing of Freedmen or
their descendents on the Dawes Rolls in the early twentieth century
provided no insurance against resistance to their citizenship rights,
including the right to vote in tribal elections, up to the day Lucy Allen was
decided in 2006 and Freedmen’s descendents were recognized as citizens.
That Cherokees will go to polls in 2007 to consider amending their
Constitution to exclude Freedmen’s descendents indicates both the strength
of the Cherokee political process to effect the will of the people and the
weakness of the Dawes Rolls to secure rights promised in 1866.
On the other hand, biological definitions of Cherokee identity—
“blood”-based identities—are inextricably indebted to the effective history
of colonialism and its race-based hierarchies. The ready adaptation to and
deployment of Euroamerican systems of racial classification by Cherokees
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to Cherokee slave-holding
and strict slave codes that permitted Cherokee-white intermarriages but
prohibited and punished severely relations of intimacy between Cherokees
and “people of color.” The Cherokee construction of a national identity
after 1839 melded a racial commitment to the preservation of Cherokee
“blood” and the prosperity of the Cherokee Nation. This “blood”-based
sense of Cherokee identity fit well with the race science of the nineteenth
century and with the philosophy and public policy of assimilation which
guided the Dawes Commission in its work of tribal enrollment and
allotment of land. The resulting Dawes Rolls established race-based
categorizations of complex social and biological identities of both Native
Americans and African Americans. When, as now, the Cherokee Nation
turns to the Dawes Rolls as its exclusive authority for citizenship, it is
perpetuating those categorizations and their race-value significations by
embedding them in the very body of the Nation.
This Article has proposed that a version of the model of Radical
Indigeneity created by sociologist Eva Garroutte could provide an
alternative to forcing Cherokee voters into unwise choices between biology
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or law. Ancestry is rescued from biology when it is reconceived as a mode
of kinship. Law is saved from fetishism to the Dawes Rolls when
sovereignty is exercised to frame new citizenship criteria that are both
robust and flexible. Engaging the resources of Radical Indigeneity would
require Cherokees “by blood” and Freedmen’s descendents to participate in
a sustained and honest dialogue on Cherokee political identity from within
indigenous norms and authorities and the critical evaluation of Cherokee
history and culture.
The sovereign right of the Cherokee Nation to determine its criteria for
citizenship should never be denied or compromised by federal intervention.
The “hard case” of whether to sustain a decision of the Cherokee Nation to
exclude the Freedmen’s descendents, were the issue to reach federal court
or the floor of Congress, would surely “make bad law.” The wise use of
Cherokee sovereignty, however, counsels patience, not a rush to the polls;
honest, sustained, and no doubt difficult dialogue, not politicking; and the
critical reinterpretation of cultural resources in the service of kinship, not
the blind reproduction of divisive racial hegemonies—in short, ga-du-gi,
“all working together.”

